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that the no-aid theory has largely ignored—the pervasive funding of religious schools
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important implications for modern law. Most significantly, it suggests that where a
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INTRODUCTION
No one likes paying for causes they ﬁnd objectionable. The thought of
subsidizing activities one does not like seems galling at best, an assault on
freedom of conscience at worst. And given that fact, it is no wonder that the
Supreme Court long ago read the Establishment Clause as containing a rule
to that eﬀect. In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Hugo Black famously
said that because the Clause forbids forcing citizens to pay for religion they
oppose, “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions . . . whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion.”1 In short, the Establishment Clause meant government
could not “aid” religion, especially by subsidizing religious activity.2
In Everson itself, the Court stopped short of applying the no-aid theory
as broadly as its rhetoric suggested and upheld a program paying for bus rides
to both secular and religious schools.3 But it eventually adopted the theory
wholesale. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court held that the Establishment
Clause forbade any government aid that had the “primary eﬀect” of
supporting religion.4 The main upshot was a ban on funding for K-12 religious
schools, no matter the government’s purpose in providing funds. But as the
century progressed, problems piled up.
The ﬁrst one involved the Free Exercise Clause. As interpreted in Lemon,
the no-aid theory categorically forbade government from ﬁnancing the
religious activities of private citizens. Yet both before and after Lemon, the
1
2
3
4

330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
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Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required providing things like
unemployment beneﬁts to citizens whose religious practice had made them
ineligible.5 The no-aid theory thus seemed to imply that the Establishment
Clause forbade exactly what the Free Exercise Clause required.6
There were also diﬃculties in application. The no-aid theory prohibited
any aid that subsidized religious activity regardless of the government’s
purpose.7 As a result, it required asking about the use of aid, and speciﬁcally
whether the aid could be “diverted” to religious activities.8 But because almost
any form of aid can be applied toward something religious, the outcomes in
the cases depended almost entirely on what diﬀerent coalitions of Justices
were willing to imagine in terms of use. Over time, that situation produced
some strikingly unpersuasive distinctions. Paying for textbooks was
permissible, but paying for maps was not.9 Subsidizing rides to religious
schools was acceptable, but rides from those schools to museums was not.10
Paying for special education teachers in religious schools to diagnose learning
diﬃculties was allowed, but paying for them to treat those diﬃculties was
not.11 In the aggregate, the results made the no-aid theory look like a guessing
game, not a sound legal rule.

5 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (holding that disqualifying a citizen from
beneﬁts solely because of religion imposes a burden on the free exercise of religion); Thomas v. Rev.
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (concluding that an employee who terminated his employment because
of religious objections to building weapons could not be denied beneﬁts).
6 A few Justices noted the issue, but there was no working majority to resolve it. See Sherbert,
374 U.S. at 414-16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the Court’s holding
forbidding the denial of unemployment compensation based on religious practice, but noting that
the Court’s no aid-jurisprudence “must inevitably lead to a diametrically opposed result”); Thomas,
450 U.S. at 724-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (making a similar point).
7 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (invalidating a funding program under the Establishment Clause
even though there was “no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion”).
8 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840-41 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that under the no-aid paradigm, the Court had “long been concerned that secular
government aid not be diverted to the advancement of religion”).
9 Compare Allen, 392 U.S. at 238 (holding that a program paying for secular textbooks for use
in religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause), with Wolman v. Walter 433 U.S. 229,
249-51 (1977) (holding a program providing maps for use in religious schools unconstitutional under
the Establishment Clause), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
10 Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (upholding a program providing
subsidies to parents for transporting children to private religious schools), with Wolman, 433 U.S. at
252-55 (holding that a program providing state funds to transport children from religious schools to
ﬁeld trips violated the Establishment Clause); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (1992) (noting these examples).
11 Compare Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-42 (holding that providing funds for diagnostic testing of
speech and hearing diﬃculties at religious schools was permissible), with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 367-73 (1975) (holding that reimbursing therapeutic services to address those concerns was not),
overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); see also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE,
SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 94 (2014) (noting this example and others).
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There was also a more fundamental problem. The no-aid theory rested on
the idea that taxpayers should not be required to pay for religious activities they
oppose. But in point of fact, all aid by its nature is fungible. Providing any form
of aid to churches or even individual religious citizens predictably subsidizes
religious activities because it leaves those groups with more money to spend on
religion.12 And as a result, the no-aid theory implied that even benefits like
police and fire protection for churches were unconstitutional. To be sure, no
Justice was willing to go that far. But it was difficult to explain why, at least if
‘no aid’ meant what it said.13 And that fact, combined with the theory’s harsh
results, made it seem callous and even hostile toward religious citizens.
Given these diﬃculties, it is no surprise that the Court has turned to an
alternative principle. In Everson, Justice Black had said that notwithstanding
the no-aid theory, “the state [ought] to be . . . neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers,” and that government cannot
exclude citizens “because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the
beneﬁts of public welfare legislation.”14 Justice Black did not elaborate on the
normative force behind that statement, but it follows easily enough. Money
and other state beneﬁts are valuable to everyone: they inﬂuence people’s
choices and act as powerful tools to encourage and discourage behavior.
Where religious entities provide public goods, funding them on equal terms
with other providers does not encourage religion; it simply compensates these
groups for a public service. But refusing to fund them solely because of
religion is a penalty on religious practice. It discourages religion and
undermines the Constitution’s promise that government will remain neutral
with respect to citizens’ religious choices.
During the past two decades, the Court’s cases have gradually moved
closer to that view. Under current doctrine, government may provide money
directly to churches and religious schools that deliver secular goods so long
as it restricts the aid to secular uses.15 The Court has also held that states may
12 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring) (observing in the context of school
funding that “[w]hat the taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science
without any trace of proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for religious training”).
13 In Everson, Justice Black insisted that services like police and ﬁre protection were acceptable
because they were “indisputably marked oﬀ from the religious function,” and thus could be classiﬁed
as “public welfare legislation” rather than aid to religion. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18. But as many
have noted since, that distinction is hardly satisfying. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Churches,
Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 138 (2017) (“Every law
providing for any form of neutrally distributed government [aid] can be understood as public welfare
legislation. And any part of that [aid] that goes to a religious organization can be understood as
support for religion.”).
14 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16, 18 (emphasis omitted).
15 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 861-64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing
procedural safeguards that help ensure government funds are used for secular purposes and deeming
these safeguards constitutionally suﬃcient).
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include religious schools in voucher programs so long the decision to fund
them is the result of “true private choice” exercised by “individual recipients”
like parents.16 And most recently, in Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue, the Court held that state funding for private religious schools is not
just permissible, but required in instances where the government chooses to
fund comparable secular recipients.17
The Court’s movement away from a broad no-aid theory and toward a
principle of “neutrality” is now well-entrenched as a matter of precedent. Yet
the Court has done little to explain how its current approach to funding under
the Religion Clauses is consistent with Founding-era history. In Everson, both
the majority and the dissent insisted that the history from Virginia—and
especially famous statements by Thomas Jeﬀerson and James Madison—
demonstrated that the Establishment Clause stripped government of “all
power . . . to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions.”18 And critics
of the Court’s current jurisprudence continue to argue as much. According to
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for instance, the Court’s modern funding
jurisprudence has “no basis in the history to which the Court has repeatedly
turned to inform its understanding of the Establishment Clause.”19
Numerous scholars also agree. According to Professor Noah Feldman, the
Court has “adopt[ed] a position almost squarely the opposite of the original
intent of the Establishment Clause,” since the Clause was meant to “guard
against the possibility that a citizen’s tax dollars would be used to support
religious teachings with which he might possibly disagree.”20 Likewise,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-53 (2002).
140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020) (“A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State
decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”).
18 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13; see also id. at 33-47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (analyzing the
historical evidence in a similar way). In Everson, the Court relied primarily on two passages. The
ﬁrst was Thomas Jeﬀerson’s claim that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves . . . is sinful and tyrannical.” Thomas Jeﬀerson, A Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
545, 545 (Julian P. Boyd, Lyman H. Butterﬁeld & Mina R. Bryan eds., 1950) [hereinafter A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom]. The second was James Madison’s insistence that “the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence . . . for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.” JAMES
MADISON, TO THE HONORABLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA:
A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55,
57 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) [hereinafter MADISON, MEMORIAL].
19 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2030-31 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Although less totalizing in their criticisms, other Justices have made
similar assertions. See, e.g., Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2286 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is
“no meaningful diﬀerence between the concerns that Madison and Jeﬀerson raised and the concerns
inevitably raised by taxpayer support for scholarships to religious schools”).
20 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 209 (2005). In this passage, Professor Feldman is
speaking of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). But there is little doubt that the statement also captures Feldman’s
16
17
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Richard Fallon argues that the Court’s doctrine has been too lax, since “the
backdrop of history” proves that the Establishment Clause “protects each of
us against being taxed . . . to support a religion to which we do not
subscribe.”21 Caroline Corbin contends the Court’s insistence on neutrality is
ﬂawed, since “no reasonable person of [the Founding] era would dispute that
it violated freedom of conscience to be conscripted into ﬁnancially supporting
a religion not one’s own.”22 And many others have expressed similar views.23
In Espinoza, the Court took an tentative step toward answering these
criticisms, observing in a brief paragraph that Founding-era Americans had
provided at least some funding for religious schools.24 That development was
notable—never before had a majority of the Supreme Court oﬀered any
historical justiﬁcation for its movement away from the no-aid theory. But it
was also incomplete. As Justice Stephen Breyer observed in dissent, Espinoza’s
wider view of the Court’s recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See FELDMAN, supra, at 218,
247 (suggesting that the ban on government funding for religion is “the cornerstone . . . of the
American tradition of the separation of government institutions from the institutional church,” and
that “[a]ll attempts to use government resources to institutionalize religious practices” ought to be
banned); see also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
346, 417 (2002) [hereinafter Feldman, Intellectual Origins] (“[T]he Framers broadly agreed that
coercively requiring dissenters to contribute funds to religious purposes with which they disagreed
constituted a violation of conscience.”).
21 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 90 (2017).
22 Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 54 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 617, 653 (2019).
23 See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN & ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE RELIGION CLAUSES: THE
CASE FOR SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE 64 (2020) (arguing that “it is wrong to tax people to
support the religion of others” and concluding the Court’s case law would be unrecognizable to
James Madison); William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichols, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing
and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 234 (arguing that “the violation of an
individual’s conscience caused by supporting a religion to which she does not adhere” was “exactly
the type of harm that was of concern to the Framers” and criticizing the Court’s jurisprudence on
this basis); Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 U. VA. L. REV. 317, 318 (2011)
(drawing on Founding-era history to suggest that the Establishment Clause forbids “requiring
citizens to pay for religious expressions they ﬁnd objectionable” and arguing this prohibition should
be extended to other expenditures that violate taxpayer conscience); Nelson Tebbe, Excluding
Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1273-74 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s jurisprudence and asserting
that “the religious freedom of taxpayers who object to supporting institutions with which they
diﬀer” has “some pedigree in American constitutional history”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 209-11 (1992) (arguing that, rightly understood, the
Establishment Clause “require[s] excluding religious organizations from public programs” because
the Clause “protects individuals from compulsory ﬁnancial support of other people’s religion
through the tax system”). There are, of course, some notable dissents from this view. See, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 13, at 144-45 (suggesting tentatively that “the Founders were not concerned
about money that went to churches in pursuit of secular goals”); Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent
and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 89-90 (2009) (questioning
expansive interpretations of Founding-era evidence that would disqualify religious entities from
neutral funding programs).
24 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258 (2020).
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discussion of the historical evidence was too limited to demonstrate a clear
pattern of practice, much less a principled one.25 Nor have individual Justices
ﬁlled the void. The only attempt—a solo concurrence written by Justice
Clarence Thomas more than two decades ago—conﬁned its discussion almost
entirely to an exposition of James Madison’s views, and did not purport to
oﬀer anything like a comprehensive analysis of the issue.26
The Court’s failure to oﬀer a historical explanation for its doctrine about
funding for religious organizations is troubling, especially for a jurisprudence
that claims to be focused on “historical practices and understandings.”27 But
this Article suggests—contrary to critics and most scholars—that Foundingera history and the Court’s funding jurisprudence are not actually at odds.
More speciﬁcally, it suggests that the supposed divergence between
Founding-era history and the Court’s modern funding cases arises almost
entirely from a misunderstanding of the historical record.
Since Everson, it has been widely assumed that the Founding generation
believed that government was forbidden from forcing taxpayers to subsidize
religious activity. On further inspection, however, that interpretation of the
evidence is unconvincing. Although broad arguments against paying for
religion sometimes appeared in debates over church taxes, the evidence
suggests they did little to move public opinion. Rather, such arguments were
frequently criticized as calling into question all taxation to support the public
good, and were easily evaded by making church tax schemes more tolerant.28
But even more importantly, the idea that taxpayers can never be required to
pay for someone else’s religious activity does not square with Founding-era
practice. Both before and after the ratiﬁcation of the First Amendment, the
federal government and virtually every state that ended church taxes also
funded religious activity—speciﬁcally, religious schools of all kinds—despite
the fact that even in the Founding era, Americans took their religious
disagreements seriously.29 The practice was pervasive, and far more so than
Espinoza’s brief sentences implied. Those facts provide good reason to think
the Constitution does not—nor did it ever—contain an expansive categorical
rule against subsidizing religion.
25 Id. at 2286-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that many of the majority’s historical
examples were without force and insisting that Founding-era supporters of religious liberty
perceived an “obvious contradiction between the reasons for prohibiting compelled support [for
clergy] and the eﬀect of taxpayer funding for religious education”).
26 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-56 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
27 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (observing that the
Establishment Clause “must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings’”
(quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
28 See infra notes 51–59, 181–182 and accompanying text.
29 See infra Sections II.A–B (documenting such funding in the states); Section II.C
(documenting such funding by the federal government and actors under its control).

118

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 111

How then should the evidence be understood? Simply stated, the answer
is as follows. By the end of the eighteenth century, Americans largely agreed
that government could not rightfully compel people to engage in speciﬁc
forms of religious worship. And quite ingeniously, proponents of religious
liberty realized that the same argument could be extended to church taxes.
Far from being just another form of taxation, church taxes were a coerced
religious observance. They were a compelled sacriﬁce to God, a tithe—an
oﬀering of money, taken by force, solely to ﬁnance the religious function of
ministers and churches.30 And because that was so, these writers reasoned,
laws requiring them were no diﬀerent from laws forcing citizens to engage in
other speciﬁc modes of worship. To be sure, coercing tithes for other people’s
churches was even more objectionable, and many people did not hesitate to
say so. But the controlling point was that church taxes were a coerced religious
observance—they invaded each citizen’s right to “render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to [H]im.”31 And
understanding that argument in its original context yields several signiﬁcant
insights for both history and modern law.
First, recognizing that Founding-era objections to church taxes rested in
signiﬁcant part on an argument about coerced religious observance explains
facts about the Founding era that the no-aid reading does not. In the years
surrounding the ratiﬁcation of the First Amendment, virtually every state
that ended church taxes also provided tax money to religious schools—
including schools directly aﬃliated with a church.32 And the same was true of
the federal government after the Establishment Clause was ratiﬁed.33 Yet as
far as we know, proponents of religious freedom did not object to that
practice. Rather, they seem to have actively supported it.34 Those facts are
diﬃcult to square with the idea that taxpayers can never be required to
subsidize religious activity. But they are perfectly explainable if one begins
from the premise that requiring citizens to contribute funds for the exclusive
purpose of ﬁnancing worship is a coerced tithe, but support for things like
education is not, even if some of the money might also be used for religion.
Admittedly, we cannot be sure why Founding-era supporters of religious
liberty objected to funding for churches but not for religious schools. But a
theory focused on coerced observance provides a plausible explanation, and
one that makes their widespread practice both understandable and principled.

30
31
32
33
34

See infra Part I.
MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56.
See infra Section II.A–B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section I.B.
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Second, understanding the Founding-era view that church taxes were
coerced tithes provides a new vantage point for evaluating the Court’s
contemporary jurisprudence. The modern notion that funding schemes must
be “neutral” in their treatment of secular and religious beneﬁciaries is not a
Founding-era concept. But rightly understood, the Founding-era evidence
leads to a similar place.
Members of the Founding generation who opposed church taxes did not
object to funding religious schools. On the contrary, foreshadowing cases like
Espinoza, many of them argued that refusing to fund certain schools because
of their religious activity was a form of discrimination, and their fellow
citizens agreed.35 On this view, government was not forbidden from providing
funds to religious entities in pursuit of public goods. Rather, it was forbidden
from taking religion into account—either by extracting funds solely to ﬁnance
a recipient’s religion, or by denying funds where the sole reason for doing so
was disapproval of a recipient’s religion. And under modern conditions, that
principle leads to neutral treatment of religious and secular entities as a
matter of course. Where the government’s interest in funding rests on
something other than ﬁnancing religion for its own sake, it will necessarily
treat religious and secular entities providing the relevant good evenhandedly.
At the same time, the historical evidence suggests some important
correctives to current doctrine. Although the Court has moved away from the
broadest versions of the no-aid theory, much of its jurisprudence remains
focused on the use of money by beneﬁciaries. That focus has led even some of
the Court’s more recent cases to embrace nonsensical distinctions and
unconvincing formalisms which have been quite rightly attacked.36 The
Founding-era evidence points the way out of the muddle. As an original
matter, church taxes were analogous to coerced tithes because they provided
money solely to support religious functions. In other words, they were created
with the aim of ﬁnancing religion and in fact did so, which is why the
Founders viewed them as coerced tithes.37 And that realization can provide
signiﬁcant guidance for modern doctrine. Where a program provides money
for a nonreligious purpose like education or social services and is available
without regard to religion, there is little reason to think it requires anything
like a coerced tithe on the part of the citizenry. So long as a program does not
treat the religious aspect of a beneﬁciary’s conduct as an independent basis
for funding, it is not an establishment of religion.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I begins the historical
examination by considering the evidence from Virginia. It suggests that the
35
36
37

See infra notes 278–284, 315–330 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 425–431 and accompanying text (describing these problems).
See infra Part III.
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argument equating church taxes with a coerced religious observance played
an important role in the debate, and provides an explanation as to why
proponents of religious liberty opposed church taxes but did not object to
funding religious schools. This Part also explores the origins of the argument
that church taxes were a coerced observance and explains how that argument
limited the scope of objections to funding religion, even among the most
radical supporters of religious liberty. Part II widens the historical frame to
consider historical practice, especially evidence regarding funding for
religious schools in disestablished states and by the federal government in the
period surrounding the adoption of the Establishment Clause. Part III
examines in more detail the nature of the claim that church taxes were a
coerced religious observance, and especially the characteristics of those taxes
that were of primary concern to advocates of religious freedom. Part IV
summarizes the evidence and considers how it supports certain aspects of
modern doctrine while calling others into question.
I. CHURCH TAXES AS COERCED TITHES
Since Everson, it has been widely assumed that Founding-era history
supports the idea that the Establishment Clause forbids forcing citizens to
fund someone else’s religious activity, especially religious schools. And
supporters of that theory have long viewed the history from Virginia as
providing the strongest support for that conclusion. This Part questions that
view. It ﬁrst argues that the more important claim in Virginia was that church
taxes were a coerced religious observance—a tithe—and that this insight
helps explain why opponents of church taxes did not also oppose the state’s
repeated funding of religious schools. It continues by examining the origins
of the argument that church taxes were a coerced religious oﬀering and the
ways this argument deﬁned the scope of Founding-era complaints about
paying for religion.
A. The Debate in Virginia
Prior to the American Revolution, many colonies imposed compulsory taxes
to support a single established church. Virginia was among these, and mandated
that eligible citizens within the commonwealth be taxed to support the Anglican
Church in their parish.38 In the Commonwealth’s earliest laws, those taxes were

38 I use the term “Anglican” to refer to the Church of England in America before
independence. I use the term “Protestant Episcopal Church” or “Episcopal Church” to refer to this
denomination after independence.
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known as “tithes,” after the biblical mandate in which God commanded the
Israelites to set aside one-tenth of their property for the temple priests.39
In establishing and maintaining its tithing system, Virginia’s practices
resembled those of England. But there were also some important differences.
Most notably, unlike in England, where tithes ran with the land,40 in Virginia
they were computed by reference to tobacco and assigned on a per capita basis.
The law set the salary for the local Anglican minister at 16,000 pounds of
tobacco per year,41 which was divided by the number of “tithables” within a
parish—that is, all free males and slaves over the age of sixteen.42 Typically,
the required payment amounted to thirty to sixty pounds of tobacco per
tithable each year—a modest sum—that was collected by the churchwardens.43
Following American independence, however, things began to change.
In 1776, Virginia enacted a Declaration of Rights, which contained a
provision declaring that “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”44 That law oﬃcially ended
things like discriminatory licensing requirements for preaching and
compelled church attendance.45 But it was notably silent on the question of
church taxes. Defenders of establishment in Virginia quickly realized they
could never garner public support for continuing taxes that funded only the
Anglican church.46 So instead, they coalesced around a compromise known as
the general assessment. Like Virginia’s earlier tithing regime, the assessment
would have required all citizens to submit to a tax speciﬁcally designed to
support religious worship by paying for clergy salaries and church buildings.
39 See Act IX (1629), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE,
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS IN VIRGINIA 144 (1823) (“IT is thought fitt that all those
that worke in the ground of what qualitie or condition soever, shall pay tithes to the ministers.”); see
also Numbers 18:21-24 (King James) (“And, behold, I have given the children of Levi all the tenth in
Israel for an inheritance, for their service which they serve . . . . [T]he tithes of the children of Israel,
which they oﬀer as an heave oﬀering unto the Lord, I have given to the Levites to inherit . . . .”)
For an account of the development of Virginia’s tithing system, see JAMES BELL, THE IMPERIAL
ORIGINS OF THE KING’S CHURCH IN EARLY AMERICA 1607–1783, at 75-76 (2008).
40 See generally ERIC J. EVANS, THE CONTENTIOUS TITHE 16-37 (1976) (describing the
history and mechanics of England’s tithing system).
41 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2152 (2003).
42 Arthur Pierce Middleton, The Colonial Virginia Parish, 40 HIST. MAG. PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH 431, 437-38 (1971).
43 Id. Failure to pay resulted in punishment by order of the county courts. See William H. Seiler,
The Anglican Parish Vestry in Colonial Virginia, 22 J.S. HIST. 310, 311 (1956) (explaining this process).
44 See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776–
1787, at 34-35 (1977); see also VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 7 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE,
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812, 3814 (1909).
45 Baptists and others were punished for preaching without a license prior to the Declaration
of Rights. See McConnell, supra note 41, at 2164-65.
46 BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 35.
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But unlike the prior scheme, it would allow citizens to direct their money to
the church of their choice.47
Jeﬀerson was one of the ﬁrst in Virginia to argue against calls for a general
assessment. And in 1779, his supporters in the legislature introduced
Jeﬀerson’s now-famous “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.”48 The
preamble contained Jeﬀerson’s well-known argument about paying for
religious activity one does not like:
[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical; that even
the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion,
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the
particular pastor whose morals he would make his pattern . . . .49

Numerous commentators have treated Jeﬀerson’s broad claim about
paying for disagreeable religious opinions as articulating a widely held view
that government was categorically forbidden from subsidizing religious
activity.50 But Jeﬀerson’s argument was hardly so inﬂuential. On the contrary,
it suﬀered from at least two diﬃculties that seem to have rendered it largely
powerless to sway public opinion.
The ﬁrst diﬃculty was that Jeﬀerson’s argument was unresponsive to the
actual controversy. Unlike Virginia’s prior tithing regime, the whole point of
a general assessment was that it maintained state support for religion without
forcing anyone to “furnish contributions” for disagreeable views.51 Instead, it
allowed people choice over where their taxes would be directed.52 That fact
was not lost on Jeﬀerson’s contemporaries. According to one writer in the
Virginia Gazette, Jeﬀerson’s argument about paying for disagreeable opinions
was “attacking the old establishment of a particular church . . . and in that
Id.
Id. at 47.
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 545.
See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2286 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Jeﬀerson’s statement reﬂected a well-considered Founding-era position
that “the allocation of state aid” for religious schools and universities was prohibited); Rosenberger
v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868-71 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Jeﬀerson’s statement as proof that “[u]sing public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the
word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to
accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of public money”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 803 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (interpreting Jeﬀerson’s statement as demonstrating
that the Establishment Clause is violated when “government requires individuals to support the
practices of a faith with which they do not agree”); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1215 (1947) (citing Jeﬀerson for a similar proposition).
51 Accord A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 545.
52 See Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 383 (noting the general assessment “had
been designed to avoid any charges of coercion of dissenters to pay taxes to support religious
teachings with which they disagreed”).
47
48
49
50
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view is raising a ghost to frighten us with.”53 Moreover, although many in
Virginia expressed concern about the possibility that Jews and Muslims would
be forced to pay for Christian churches, that problem was easily solved by
allowing those citizens to direct their money elsewhere.54 And as a result,
even George Washington admitted he did not see the problem with a general
assessment, at least if the objection involved paying for disagreeable
religion.55 Jeﬀerson’s argument was stirring rhetoric. But it was simply not a
convincing objection to the general assessment.
The second difficulty with Jefferson’s claim arose from the substance of the
argument itself. In making his assertion about paying for disagreeable religious
opinions, Jefferson was focusing on a feature of traditional establishments that
many found offensive. But taken to its natural conclusion, Jefferson’s argument
risked collapsing into absurdity. Proponents of the general assessment agreed
that government could not dictate matters of conscience. But they insisted that
construing that freedom as Jefferson had done—as a right to avoid paying for
“opinions which [one] disbelieves and abhors”—called into question any form
of taxation to support the public interest.56 “[W]hy do you compel men to
contribute to the salaries of your judges,” asked Jefferson’s critic in the Gazette,
“and [then] submit, against their wills, to the decisions of the judges?”57 He
continued: “You must answer that these regulations are for the general good
and therefore individuals must acquiesce: This answer is to me perfectly
satisfactory, and . . . doth equally apply to religious regulations, judged by a
majority to be for the general good.”58 For many in Jefferson’s time—as for
53 “A Social Christian,” To the Publick, VA. GAZETTE, Sept. 18, 1779. During the assessment
controversy others also agreed, asserting that the assessment imposed “not ‘the smallest coercion’”
since it allowed citizens choice in how their money was to be directed. See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 145 (1986) (citation omitted).
54 For instance, the famous Virginia statesman Richard Henry Lee explained to Madison that
he “fully agree[d] . . . that true freedom embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo as well as the
Christian religion,” and he hoped the assessment would reﬂect this more “liberal ground.” See Letter
from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784), reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 65.
55 Washington wrote:

Although, no man’s sentiments are more opposed to any kind of restraint upon religious
principles than mine are, yet I must confess, that I am not amongst the number of those,
who are so much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the support of
that which they profess, if of the denomination of Christians, or declare themselves
Jews, Mahometans, or otherwise, and thereby obtain proper relief.
Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct. 3, 1785), reprinted in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 1782-1785, at 506 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1891).
56 A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 545 (emphasis omitted).
57 “A Social Christian,” supra note 53.
58 Id.
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many today—the idea that people have a right to avoid subsidizing opinions
they find objectionable was implausible.59
Jeﬀerson’s proposal to ban church taxes during the summer of 1779 was
passed over without a vote.60 And in subsequent years, calls for a general
assessment gained signiﬁcant popularity in Virginia, thanks in part to Patrick
Henry, one of the state’s most popular politicians. In 1784, Henry introduced
a bill “Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion.”61
Unlike some prior proposals, Henry’s bill did not aim to establish speciﬁc
articles of faith or contain other more controversial measures.62 Instead, it
simply required that all citizens be taxed to support the Christian minister of
their choice. Moreover, the act provided that those not wishing to contribute
to any church simply declare their opposition to doing so and the money
would be allocated to “seminaries of learning” within the Commonwealth.63
It even provided a partial exemption for Quakers and Mennonites, since these
groups did not employ professional clergy.64
Proponents of religious liberty like James Madison and Thomas Jeﬀerson
readily perceived the threat that Henry’s bill posed. Indeed, Henry’s
popularity was so powerful that Jeﬀerson wryly suggested, “What we have to
do I think is devoutly to pray for his death.”65 But by the time Henry’s bill
was actually introduced, several developments leveled the playing ﬁeld. First,
Henry had been appointed governor, leaving defense of his bill to less able
orators in the legislature.66 But even more importantly, by the time Henry’s
bill came to a vote, defenders of religious liberty had begun to rely on a
diﬀerent set of arguments than Jeﬀerson had been able to muster in 1779. And
59 See, e.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132
HARV. L. REV. 171, 180 (2018) (noting that “[r]equiring people to pay money that can be used for speech
with which they disagree is utterly commonplace” and arguing that if Jefferson was right that
demanding such payments is sinful, “it’s sin and tyranny that are everywhere in modern government”);
see also Jud Campbell, Compelled Subsidies and Original Meaning, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 249, 252
(2019) (“Jefferson’s ideas about religious freedom were not widely held at the Founding and are thus an
unreliable guide to the First Amendment’s original meaning.”).
60 BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 56.
61 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784), reprinted in
BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 188-89 [hereinafter A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers].
62 See CURRY, supra note 53, at 139-41 (contrasting Henry’s bill with earlier general
assessment proposals).
63 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 189. As Carl Esbeck has
observed, “seminaries” meant “schools of general education.” See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 79 n.121.
64 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 189. The exemption did not
relieve Quakers and Mennonites from paying the tax, but provided that they were not required to
use the funds to support a minister. Instead, they could use the money “in a manner which they shall
think best calculated to promote their particular mode of worship.” See id.
65 Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to James Madison (Dec. 8, 1784), in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 65, 65 (emphasis and brackets omitted).
66 BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 100.
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foremost among them was the claim that the general assessment was
impermissible because it forced citizens to engage in a state-mandated
religious observance.
To understand the point, begin with the opening paragraphs of Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance. Madison began his Remonstrance by insisting that
“Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of
discharging it” must be “left to the conviction and conscience of every man.”67
But how did the assessment violate that principle, since it did not actually
require anyone to support a church against his will? Madison insisted the
answer was as follows:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only
as he believes to be acceptable to him [i.e., to God]. . . . We maintain therefore
that in matters of Religion, no man[’]s right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.68

On a ﬁrst read, the meaning of this passage seems obscure. But as a
response to the arguments being made by the assessment’s supporters, it
makes more sense. Supporters of Henry’s bill argued the general assessment
was acceptable because unlike traditional establishments, it did not exalt a
single church or “prescrib[e] a mode or form of worship to any.”69 Madison
responded to this argument by rejecting its premise. Allowing people to
direct payments to the church of their choice or to education did not require
them to make a contribution to someone else’s minister. But the problem ran
deeper than that: church taxes were objectionable no matter how tolerant the
scheme because they deprived citizens of the right to worship only as they
wished—to “render to the Creator such homage and such only” as conscience
directed. The assessment was an aﬀront to freedom because it amounted to a
coerced religious observance—a compelled act of “homage” to God, a tithe.
The idea that the assessment mandated a coerced tithe also illuminates
other passages in the Remonstrance. Most importantly, it clariﬁes Madison’s
famous statement about three pence, the other piece of historical evidence
often cited in support of a categorical no-aid theory. Claiming that the
assessment was indistinguishable from other forms of establishment,
Madison argued: “the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence . . . for the support of any one establishment, may force him to

MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
CURRY, supra note 53, at 138 (quoting a petition from inhabitants of Caroline County); see
also Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, supra note 54, at 65 (contending the general
assessment was permissible because the Declaration of Rights prohibited only “forcing modes of
faith and forms of worship, [not] compelling contribution for the support of religion in general”).
67
68
69
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conform to any other establishment.”70 Many modern readers have
interpreted Madison as arguing that citizens cannot be forced to pay even one
penny that subsidizes someone else’s religious practice.71 But context makes
that interpretation diﬃcult to sustain: remember, the assessment did not
actually require anyone to contribute to a repressive state church. Moreover,
just a few years later, Madison advocated exempting Quakers from militia
service without paying for a substitute—a policy that almost surely would
have required taxpayers to pay more than ‘three pence’ to accommodate the
Quaker religion.72 Reading Madison’s statement as an unqualiﬁed objection
to subsidizing religion just does not ﬁt the facts.
But consider another possibility. In the preceding paragraphs of his
Remonstrance, Madison had argued that the assessment was unacceptable
because it amounted to a coerced religious observance, a compelled act of
“homage” to God. And in making his claim about three pence—that whoever
can “force a citizen to contribute three pence . . . may force him to conform to
any other establishment whatsoever”—Madison was simply extending that
argument about coerced observance to its natural conclusion. By allowing the
government to mandate a tithe, even one as trivial as requiring only three
pence, the assessment implied that government could mandate any act of
religious worship whatever. That claim makes much more sense given the actual
features of Henry’s bill. It also mirrors arguments by others in this period.
For instance, roughly ten years before Madison’s Remonstrance, famed
Baptist minister Isaac Backus argued that compulsory tithes exceeded the
government’s authority since “such communications are called sacrifices to God
more than once in the New Testament,” and coercing them implied that “civil
rulers [may] appoint and enforce . . . any other sacrifice as well as this.”73 What
is more, like Madison, Backus explicitly invoked the image of three pence to
remind his readers of another “little tax” that stood for so much more:
MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 57
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 638 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Madison’s statement indicates that conscience is violated by “the
expenditure of an identiﬁable three pence . . . for the support of a religious cause”); Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790-91 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Madison’s statement
about three pence to conclude that “the First Amendment . . . deprives the Government of all power
to make any person pay out one single penny against his will to be used in any way to advocate
doctrines or views he is against”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (citing Madison’s statement to support the view that the First Amendment “forbids any
appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises”).
72 See Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 911-13 (2019) (describing Madison’s position and the debate over the
Uniform Militia Act in Congress).
73 Isaac Backus, Address to the Honorable Congress of the Massachusetts Province (Nov. 22,
1774), reprinted in ALVAH HOVEY, A MEMOIR OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE REV. ISAAC
BACKUS, A.M., at 215, 217 (1859).
70
71
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That which has made the greatest noise, is a tax of three pence a pound upon
tea . . . . All America are alarmed at the [British] tea tax; though, if they
please, they can avoid it by not buying the tea; but we have no such
liberty. . . . [W]e are determined not to pay [the church tax] . . . because we
dare not render that homage to any earthly power, which I and many of my
brethren are fully convinced belongs only to God.74

The similarities between Backus’s argument and Madison’s are hard to
ignore. Both invoked the language of “homage” to support an a fortiori
argument against church taxes—if government could mandate this act of
worship, so could it mandate any other. Moreover, both referenced three pence,
not to argue that ‘one penny aiding religion is too much,’ but rather to argue
that allowing government to require even a trivial religious observance was a
precedent for tyranny, just like the tax that led to the Boston Tea Party had
been.75 And that same argument was made repeatedly by others throughout this
period.76 In all likelihood, Madison’s claim about three pence was not a
categorical objection to subsidizing someone else’s religion. Rather, his claim
was that the assessment mandated a coerced religious observance, which could
be used to justify any other coerced observance the government might demand.
The argument was about compelled worship, not compelled subsidy.
The same theory about coerced observance also animates Madison’s
argument about the assessment’s impact on non-Christians—the one place if
any where one would expect to ﬁnd a categorical objection to paying for
disagreeable religious activity. In its ﬁnal form, Patrick Henry’s bill would
have allowed objectors to direct their money to schools within their county
rather than a Christian church, though anyone choosing to do so would have
their name “ﬁxed up in the Court-house, there to remain for the inspection
of all concerned.”77 Madison disapproved, but he did not focus his complaint
on the idea that the law forced people to subsidize someone else’s religious
practice, even though many schools in Virginia were probably religious.78
Instead, he asserted that the bill presumed an improper power on the part of

Id. at 220-21.
The Tea Act imposed a tax of three pence per pound on tea imported to the American
colonies. Colonists perceived the tax as an attempt to impose “parliamentary despotism” by
symbolizing Britain’s claimed power to tax American goods without allowing the colonists to be
represented in Parliament. In protest, revolutionaries disguised as Native Americans dumped tea
into the Boston Harbor on December 16, 1773. See BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE
PATRIOTS 79 (2010) (describing the politics that led to the Boston Tea Party).
76 See, e.g., infra notes 221–223, 263–264, 349–351 and accompanying text.
77 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 189.
78 See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 79 (noting that, when the general assessment was being debated,
many schools in Virginia were “aﬃliated with a church,” though the bill did not specify whether its
opt-out would lead to the creation of additional schools).
74
75
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government to command a religious observance, and placed an additional
burden on dissenters as a result. As Madison put it,
[T]he Bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law . . . .
Whilst we assert for ourselves the freedom to embrace, to profess and to
observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny
[others] an equal freedom . . . . If this freedom be abused, it is an oﬀence
against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an
account of it be rendered.79

Madison insisted that the assessment denied citizens the right “to
embrace, to profess and to observe” religion only according to their own
conscience—again, presumably because it demanded a coerced act of worship.
He then asserted that, even if nonbelievers or others “abused” that freedom
by refusing to tithe, the state simply had no business monitoring that choice
or making it a matter of public record: “[t]o God . . . not to man, must an
account of it be rendered.” Admittedly, Madison’s argument was not as clear
as it might have been. But seemingly, his claim was the assessment violated
“that equality which ought to be the basis of every law” because it required
dissenters to publicly disclose their opposition to tithing in order to beneﬁt
from the opt-out for schools, with local persecution being the likely result.80
Madison was not alone in arguing that church tax schemes were
objectionable because they amounted to a coerced religious observance. On
the contrary, this claim was also a leading argument among his allies. For
instance, one of the most popular petitions opposing the assessment
employed language similar to Madison’s, asserting that “[w]e never resigned
to the control of government our right of . . . discharging our duty to our
Creator.”81 Another petition, signed by four hundred Quakers, decried the
assessment as “an Infringement of Religious and Civil Liberty Established by
the Bill of Rights,” clearly referring to the Commonwealth’s new protection
for the “free exercise of religion.”82 Likewise, another writer argued that
MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 57.
For a similar interpretation of this part of Madison’s Remonstrance, see Douglas Laycock,
“Noncoercive” Support for Religion: Another False Claim about the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 37 (1991). Laycock contends that the bill’s allowance to support schools would have required
“[c]itizens desiring to support an unpopular religion . . . or no religion at all . . . to declare their
unusual preference on the public record.” Id. at 46.
81 Memorial of Convention at Bethel (Aug. 1785), reprinted in CHARLES F. JAMES,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 236, 237
(1900); see also JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY 129-31 (2010) (noting the Bethel
petition received “far more signatures” than Madison’s Remonstrance); CURRY, supra note 53, at 145
(noting that the Bethel petition was “one of the most popular of the whole campaign”).
82 See BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 148 (quoting the petition); see also VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16,
reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 44, at 3814. Madison also made this argument in the Remonstrance.
79
80
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providing adequate support for one’s minister was a “duty, established by an
authority much higher than that of any Legislature on earth,” and as such
“entirely of a religious, or spiritual nature.”83
Here it is important to be clear. In opposing the general assessment,
Madison and his allies relied heavily on the idea that the assessment was a
coerced religious observance. It was the lead argument in the Remonstrance
and many other petitions.84 But that is not to say this was their only
argument.85 Nor is it to say that supporters of religious freedom were
unconcerned with taxes supporting someone else’s religion. Beginning as
early as 1776, Presbyterians in Virginia had argued it was unjust to compel
people to “pay large taxes to support an Establishment, from which their
consciences and principles oblige them to dissent,” and others certainly
agreed.86 Complaints about paying for someone else’s religion clearly had
force. But the claim about coerced religious observance seems to have deﬁned
the scope of that objection in an important way. More speciﬁcally, it oﬀers a
plausible explanation as to why Madison and others who opposed church
taxes did not oppose another practice that followed almost immediately
after—the state’s repeated funding of religious schools.
Following the debate over the general assessment, the legislature hastily
reconsidered and passed Jeﬀerson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom”
that it had originally rejected in 1779.87 The bill included not only Jeﬀerson’s
early statement about paying for disagreeable opinions, but also a crisp
prohibition: “[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . . . .”88 Many modern
readers have interpreted that law as categorically proscribing the use of

See MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 59 (arguing the assessment infringed on “the equal
right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience”).
83 “Virgilarius,” Messiurs Richards and Company, VA. J. & ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Mar. 31, 1785.
84 See JACK N. RAKOVE, BEYOND BELIEF, BEYOND CONSCIENCE 81 (2020) (observing that the
opening paragraph of Madison’s Remonstrance introducing this argument was “arguably its most important”
section); see also, e.g., supra notes 81–83 (noting the prevalence of this argument in other petitions).
85 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 23, at 83-85 (providing a paragraph-by-paragraph description of
several other important arguments in the Remonstrance).
86 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 24, 1776), reprinted in THE SACRED
RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, at 269, 269 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009).
Likewise, during the assessment controversy itself, several petitions reiterated that objection
notwithstanding the bill’s tolerant design. See CURRY, supra note 53, at 145 (noting one petition’s
observation that “to compel Jews by law to support the Christian religion . . . is an arbitrary &
impolitic usurpation which Christians ought to be ashamed of ”).
87 CURRY, supra note 53, at 146.
88 See An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 12 HENING, supra note 39, at
84-86. Proposals were made to amend the preamble to Jeﬀerson’s bill by pro-establishment forces,
leading advocates of religious freedom to cut oﬀ the debate. See BUCKLEY, supra note 44, 157-58.
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government funds “for the direct support of religious activity.”89 But the
evidence does not support that conclusion.
Throughout the revolutionary period and after, citizens who wished to
acquire land in Virginia did so by obtaining a land patent based on surveys
conducted by a designated local surveyor.90 The process entailed mandatory
fees, enforced by the sheriﬀ, which were paid to the surveyor in exchange for
his services.91 Prior to the revolution, the Virginia legislature had declared
that one-sixth of those fees were to be directed exclusively to the College of
William and Mary, which was under Anglican control.92 But after the
assessment battle and the passage of Jeﬀerson’s bill, other religious schools in
Virginia began to make requests to receive those funds. And very often, those
requests were granted.
In 1787, for instance, the Virginia legislature ordered one-sixth of the
surveyor fees collected in the district of Kentucky to be redirected to
Transylvania Seminary, a Presbyterian school.93 Like other schools chartered
during this period, the seminary was created with the purpose of providing
basic education to young people in the area.94 But there is no doubt that
“[p]rayers and singing of hymns and psalms” were “an essential part of [every]
student’s daily routine.”95 What is more, the legislature was almost surely
aware of it.96
89 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 873 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2033-34
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reading Jeﬀerson’s bill as forbidding “the use of public funds to
support core religious institutions”).
90 See SARAH H. HUGHES, SURVEYORS AND STATESMEN: LAND MEASURING IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 188 (1979) (providing a comprehensive account of Virginia’s surveyor system).
91 See Act of Nov. 1738, ch. X, reprinted in 5 HENING, supra note 39, at 38, 50-54 (setting fees
for county surveyors and providing that “the sheriﬀ of any county . . . [may] make distress upon the
slaves, goods and chattels . . . for surveiors, or other oﬃcers fees, refused or delayed to be paid”).
92 See HERBERT BAXTER ADAMS, THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 15 (1887).
93 See Act of Dec. 13, 1787, ch. XCVI, reprinted in 12 HENING, supra note 39, at 642.
94 See Act of May 1780, ch. XXI, reprinted in 10 HENING, supra note 39, at 287-88 (describing
Transylvania Seminary as “a publick school,” which accorded with the legislature’s desire to “promote
and encourage every design which may tend to the improvement of the mind and the diﬀusion of
useful knowledge”).
95 JOHN D. WRIGHT, JR., TRANSYLVANIA: TUTOR TO THE WEST 14 (1980).
96 In the months before Virginia allocated the fees to the seminary, a heated debate over the
school’s curriculum had erupted in the Kentucky Gazette. As one historian explains, critics of the
school had been suggesting—and later wrote—that “religion be entirely removed from the
curriculum” and that “the separation of church and state be applied to the seminary.” WRIGHT, supra
note 95, at 15. One of the school’s trustees, a prominent lawyer and Presbyterian minister named
Caleb Wallace, had actively assisted Jeﬀerson and Madison in opposing Virginia’s Anglican
establishment. But in September 1787, he published a letter in the Gazette ﬂatly rebuﬃng the school’s
critics. He insisted that while the school was ecumenical in its approach, it was also ﬁrmly committed
to teaching basic Christian doctrine because its leaders believed that religion was essential to the
moral formation of children. Id. at 14. Yet in spite of that clearly stated intention, the legislature
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The practice of funding religious schools with a portion of local surveyor
fees was not limited to Transylvania Seminary. Just a few weeks later, the
legislature awarded an identical privilege to Randolph Academy, another
Presbyterian school located in the far western frontier.97 The same attitude
also applied to religious colleges. Presbyterians in Hanover petitioned for a
portion of local surveyor fees to support the College of Hampden-Sydney,
but their request was passed over, perhaps because the college had already
been awarded a land grant and a lottery privilege in prior years.98 Likewise,
although the College of William and Mary had eliminated its theology faculty
shortly after the revolution,99 it continued to receive its share of surveyor fees
in most parts of the Commonwealth until 1819, all the while maintaining a
connection to the newly-formed Protestant Episcopal Church.100
How could the practice of using surveyor fees to fund religious schools like
these be consistent with Jefferson’s bill and its ban on forcing citizens to
support a religious ministry? One possibility—consistent with the broad noaid theory—is that Virginians did not consider the fees to be genuinely
coercive. After all, acquiring land was a voluntary choice. But that explanation
is not very convincing. For one thing, traditional church taxes had also taxed
voluntary conduct—the ownership of slaves in Virginia, and the ownership of
real property in England.101 Yet opponents of tithes and religious assessments
did not view that fact as a reason to abandon their objections.102 But even
setting that point aside, there is also a more obvious problem. No matter its
effect on those seeking land, the surveyor fee program contained an additional
chose to fund the seminary just a few months later. For more on Wallace’s role in the struggle against
religious establishment in Virginia, see Debra R. Neill, The Disestablishment of Religion in Virginia:
Dissenters, Individual Rights, and the Separation of Church and State, 127 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 2, 8-10 (2019).
97 Act of Dec. 31, 1787, ch. XCV, reprinted in 12 HENING, supra note 39, at 638-41.
98 See RICHARD J. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 232 (1937);
see also ALFRED J. MORRISON, THE COLLEGE OF HAMPDEN-SIDNEY: CALENDAR OF BOARD
MINUTES 1776-1876, at 37 (1789) (1912) (documenting the college’s request for surveyor fees). In
1794, the legislature awarded Hampden-Sydney an additional 1,200 acres of escheated land. See
SADIE BELL, THE CHURCH, THE STATE, AND EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 222 (1930).
99 See BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 62-63.
100 ADAMS, supra note 92, at 15; see also G. MacLaren Brydon, A List of Clergy of the Protestant
Episcopal Church Ordained After the American Revolution, 19 WM. & MARY COLL. Q. HIST. MAG.
397, 398 (1939) (noting that James Madison’s second cousin, also named James Madison, was the
ﬁrst Episcopal bishop of Virginia and also the President of William and Mary during this period,
and documenting “the large number of ministers [he] ordained”).
101 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
102 This is not to say, however, that slavery was irrelevant to the politics of disestablishment.
For an interesting exploration of this point, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Wall of Separation
Between Church and State: Slavery and Disestablishment in Late-Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 85 J.S.
HIST. 61 (2019). For more on the relationship between coercion and church taxes, see infra notes
373–412 and accompanying text.
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element of coercion: it required the surveyors themselves to surrender a
portion of earnings allotted to them by law to pay for someone else’s religious
activity. It is hard to imagine that affront would have gone unnoticed, had
Jefferson’s bill actually imposed a general ban on subsidizing religion.
But consider the problem in light of Madison’s Remonstrance. In ﬁghting
against the general assessment, Madison and others had argued the
assessment amounted to a coerced religious observance. Yet Madison did not
deny that the state had a rightful power to tax in service of the majority’s
preferences.103 So what actually distinguished one kind of law from the other?
Here, Madison’s answer was that, unlike other kinds of legislative interests,
“Religion [is] not within the cognizance of the Civil Government.”104
Legislation supporting things like education, public safety, and the like was
permissible because it aimed to further goods that governments are created
to protect: personal security, material prosperity, mutual convenience, and so
on.105 But laws like the general assessment—like other laws mandating
speciﬁc acts of worship—were not actually keyed toward any of those goods.
Instead, they provided funds speciﬁcally designed to ﬁnance religious
worship, and in that way mandated a coerced tithe on the part of the citizenry.
Admittedly, Madison and others did not explain that point as clearly as
they might have. But it closely tracks the explanations they did oﬀer.
Presbyterians from Hanover objected to “a general assessment for any
religious purpose,” but did not object to laws designed to secure the
happiness, security, and property of citizens.106 Baptists in Virginia said
legislatures had no power “to proceed in matters of religion” and that “no
human laws ought to be established for this purpose,” but did not object to
103 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56 (admitting that “no other rule exists, by which
any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority”).
104 Id. at 58; see also id. at 56 (“We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man[’]s right
is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”).
105 See Memorial of Convention at Bethel, supra note 81, at 237 (observing that “the end of civil
government is security to the temporal liberty and property of mankind,” but that “[r]eligion is
altogether personal, and the right of exercising it unalienable; and it is not . . . resigned to the will
of the society at large; and much less to the Legislature”). The theory that government is constituted
to promote temporal rather than spiritual ends is traceable to John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 12-13 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010)
(arguing that “[i]t is the Duty of the Civil Magistrate . . . to secure . . . the just Possession of . . .
things belonging to this Life,” but that “the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to
these civil Concernments,” since “no man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation”); see also
Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 255-56 (2017) (noting the
inﬂuence of theories of alienable and unalienable rights at the Founding). For more on the use of
Locke in arguments opposing church taxes, see infra notes 157–176 and accompanying text.
106 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover (June 3, 1777), reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 86, at 272, 272-73; see also Memorial of Convention at Bethel, supra note 81,
at 237 (arguing that the general assessment was “a departure from the proper line of legislation,” and
that making laws concerning religion was “an unwarrantable stretch of prerogative in the Legislature”).
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other laws involving taxing and spending, even when they beneﬁted religious
entities.107 Madison and other defenders of religious liberty in Virginia clearly
drew a distinction between ordinary taxation to support a public good and
exceptional attempts to ﬁnance religion. The argument about coerced tithes
explains that distinction.108 And as such, it oﬀers a reading of Jeﬀerson’s bill
that ﬁts much more comfortably with the facts.
In sending a portion of surveyor fees to schools like Transylvania
Seminary, there is little doubt that people realized some of those funds would
be used to pay for religious activity. But judged by the logic of Madison’s
argument, that kind of incidental eﬀect is not what mattered. Rather, what
mattered was that the obvious aim of the program—providing educational
opportunity to a rural part of the state—was well within the state’s authority.
On this theory, no one argued the surveyor fee program violated Jeﬀerson’s
bill because there was actually no conﬂict between them. Because the program
was not a targeted eﬀort to ﬁnance worship, it did not force anyone to
“support” religion in a way the law actually prohibited.109 And the other
107 See ROBERT B. SEMPLE, A HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE BAPTISTS IN
VIRGINIA 96 (1804) (documenting a resolution passed by the Baptist General Committee in
Virginia); see also infra notes 114–120 and accompanying text (documenting Baptist support for
various expenditures involving religious schools in Virginia). There is evidence of a similar attitude
among Baptists located elsewhere in the country. See infra notes 202–212, 236–239, 245 and
accompanying text.
108
This theory also explains why no one at the Founding viewed religious accommodations as
analogous to church taxes, even when they involved incidental costs. Exemptions created to relieve
burdens on religious practice served a public purpose–protecting free exercise–and thus were
distinguishable from schemes created for the exclusive purpose of ﬁnancing worship. For example,
Presbyterians from Hanover reasoned:

We never resigned to the control of government, our right of determining for ourselves
. . . and acting agreeably to the convictions of reason and conscience, in discharging our
duty to our Creator. And therefore, it would be an unwarrantable stretch of prerogative,
in the Legislature, to make laws concerning it, except for protection.
See Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover (Aug. 13, 1785), reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 86, at 304, 305; see also Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious
Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793,
1808-25 (2005) (documenting debates over religious exemptions from militia service, including
those that would have required the government to pay for a substitute, and noting the lack of
arguments involving religious establishment). This is not to say, however, that the issue of
establishment did not arise in relation to religious accommodations. For a discussion of the
Founding-era evidence on that point, see Storslee, supra note 72, at 902-15.
109 This is not to say the virtues of religious education were universally accepted. As Justice
Breyer pointed out in Espinoza, Jeﬀerson founded the University of Virginia in part to counteract
what he viewed as overweening clerical inﬂuence. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S.
Ct. 2246, 2286 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Yet even here, subsequent practice suggests that this
view did not translate into a strict prohibition on subsidizing religion. In regulations approved by
the Board of Visitors soon after the school’s founding, Jeﬀerson stated that students who chose to
attend the University of Virginia while also attending any denominational school would be “entitled
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evidence that we possess about the eﬀect of Jeﬀerson’s bill also seems to
support that conclusion.
With the defeat of the general assessment, religious dissenters in Virginia
cast off the burden of church taxes. But there was still the question of how to
deal with wealth the Anglican church had acquired over years of religious
establishment. And here, by far the most important issue involved the glebes, or
land set aside in each parish for the support of the Anglican minister.110 These
landholdings, which often contained the minister’s residence and surrounding
acreage, were typically farmed or rented out by the minister and were sometimes
very valuable.111 And although some glebes had been acquired through
donations, many had been purchased or maintained with church taxes.112
Immediately following the passage of Jeﬀerson’s bill, Baptists in Virginia
began lobbying the government to take control of the glebes, sell them, and
apply the proceeds to “public use.”113 And eventually, the legislature obliged.
In 1793, it authorized the sale of an Episcopal glebe in Botetourt parish.114
The act provided that once the proceeds had been applied to parish debts, the
remaining funds were to be paid to three schools. One of those schools was
Liberty Hall, a Presbyterian institution providing general secondary
education that later became Washington and Lee University.115 As with
Transylvania Seminary, there is no doubt that the curriculum at Liberty Hall
included school-sponsored religious worship.116 And there is also little doubt
that the glebe at Botetourt had been purchased through taxes extracted under
the old establishment.117 Yet the legislature nonetheless provided funds to the
to the same rights and privileges” as any other student—a policy that would have eﬀectively
supplemented the curriculum at neighboring religious schools using state funds. See Thomas
Jeﬀerson, Regulations of October 4, 1824, reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1106, 1110 (Saul
K. Padover ed., 1943).
110 See McConnell, supra note 41, at 2148 (explaining the glebe system).
111 See Thomas E. Buckley, Evangelicals Triumphant: The Baptists’ Assault on the Virginia Glebes,
1786–1801, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 33, 34 (1988).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 38; see also SEMPLE, supra note 107, at 73 (documenting a resolution by the Baptist
General Committee that the “public property which is . . . vested in the Protestant Episcopal
Church be sold, and the money applied to public use”).
114 Act of Oct. 1793, ch. 70, reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, 1792–1806,
at 274-76 (Samuel Shepherd ed., 1835) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE].
115 Id. at 275; see also GABEL, supra note 98, at 231 (noting Liberty Hall’s Presbyterian aﬃliation
and its later connection to Washington and Lee University). Liberty Hall was not chartered as a
college until 1812. See HENRY HOWE, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF VIRGINIA 449 (1845)
(noting Liberty Hall’s eventual incorporation as a college).
116 See BELL, supra note 98, at 229 (noting that the school’s 1782 charter stated that each day
should be “opened with prayer . . . after which every student was to apply himself silently to his
task, and never to go out without permission until dismissed with prayer in the evening”).
117 Act of Oct. 1793, ch. 70, reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 114, at 274, 275 (noting
that the land had been “purchased by the vestry of the . . . parish . . . and by law appropriated as a glebe”).
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school, “to the use of the same . . . in such proportions as [those facilitating
the sale] shall think just.”118
Likewise, when the legislature deﬁnitively resolved the glebe issue a few
years later, it followed the same pattern. In 1802, it passed a law providing
that local oﬃcials could appropriate money from glebe sales “either to the
poor . . . or to any other objects.”119 But consistent with Madison’s
Remonstrance and the statements of other supporters of religious liberty, the
law stated that oﬃcials could not “authorize an appropriation to any religious
purpose.”120 Again, the most straightforward reading of that limitation seems
to be that providing funds exclusively to support religious worship was
prohibited, but providing money for education was not, even if the latter
might also include something religious.
Since Everson, many have assumed that the history of disestablishment in
Virginia supports the theory that the Constitution prohibits government
from allowing the funds of unwilling taxpayers to be used for religion,
especially religious schools. But on further inspection, the evidence points
toward a diﬀerent conclusion. Although proponents of disestablishment in
Virginia clearly believed that taxing citizens with the sole aim of ﬁnancing
religion was prohibited, they did not object to providing taxpayer funds to
religious schools. We do not know for certain why that was so. But a plausible
explanation ﬂows from one of their main objections to church taxes. Programs
like the general assessment speciﬁcally allocated the property of citizens
solely to support religious worship, and as such, could fairly be understood as
mandating a tithe. But the same thing was not true when public funds were
provided in pursuit of some other good, even if beneﬁciaries might use some
of the funds for religion.
In considering the meaning of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court has long privileged the history from Virginia and the views of James
Madison in particular.121 And that history is surely important.122 But it is also
only part of the story. The claim that church taxes were a coerced religious
observance was originally put forward by Quakers and modiﬁed by Baptists
Id.
See Act of Dec. 1801, ch. 5, reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 114, at 314, 314-16.
Id. at 315-16.
See, e.g., Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184
(2012) (giving special weight to Madison’s views and noting his role as “the leading architect of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ariz.
Christian Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 140-42 (2011) (placing special emphasis on Madison’s
views and the history from Virginia generally).
122 See Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 895 (1986) (noting that the debate in Virginia contained the most
fully developed arguments, involved some of the era’s most prominent statesmen, and appears to
have been known and discussed by at least some others in the Founding period).
118
119
120
121
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in New England before spreading throughout America. That story sheds
additional light on why government funding of religious schools seems to
have been of little concern at the Founding, even to those most concerned
with religious freedom.
B. The Origins of the Argument
Arguments against church taxes in America originated with Quakers and
Baptists. These groups were arguably the most vigorous advocates of religious
liberty during the Founding period.123 Yet as the evidence below indicates,
they did not object to funding religious schools either.124 Understanding the
development of their argument that church taxes were a coerced religious
observance provides an explanation for that position, and one that is
consistent with their actual practice.
The story begins in Massachusetts. In 1692, the Commonwealth passed a
law requiring the inhabitants of every town (with the exception of Boston) to
provide for an “able, learned, [and] orthodox minister.”125 That scheme
diﬀered from church tax schemes that developed in other regions. Unlike
places like Virginia that provided exclusive colony-wide support for the
Anglican Church, Massachusetts’s system stressed local autonomy: eligible
citizens were required to pay church taxes, but majorities in each town
decided which church was to receive them.126 However, because Puritans were
the dominant religious group in Massachusetts, the result in nearly all
townships was an exclusive Puritan establishment.127 But that began to change
as pockets of dissent in the Commonwealth grew.

123 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (1990) (“The greatest support for disestablishment and free
exercise . . . came from evangelical Protestant denominations, especially Baptists and
Quakers . . . .”); see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 344 (1996) (noting the particular prominence of Baptists and Quakers in Founding-era struggles
for religious liberty).
124 See infra notes 193–212 and accompanying text.
125 1 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630–1833, at 124 (1971). Boston
was exempt to maintain the tradition of voluntary support that had always existed there. See
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 17 (2d rev. ed. 1994).
126 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 117. For a more extended discussion of the mechanics
of Massachusetts’s church tax system, see John Witte Jr. & Justin Latterell, The Last American
Establishment: Massachusetts, 1780–1833, in DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT:
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NEW AMERICAN STATES 1776-1833, at 399, 407-08 (Carl H.
Esbeck & Jonathan J. Den Hartog eds., 2019) [hereinafter CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS].
127 I use the term “Puritans” to describe the original Calvinist settlers of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony, and the word “Congregationalists” to describe the same denomination after 1720.
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In 1698, Quakers who formed majorities in the Massachusetts townships
of Dartmouth and Tiverton refused to select a minister or pay the tax.128 The
Quaker resistance in these townships was by all accounts the earliest largescale eﬀort to resist church taxes in America.129 To modern readers, however,
the obstinacy of these dissenters can seem puzzling. After all, “government
does all sorts of things with tax dollars that run contrary to the desires and
beliefs of individual citizens.”130 But the wellspring of Quaker resistance was
hardly so abstract.
Quakerism began in England in the 1650s as part of the most radical wing
of the Protestant Reformation. Like other Protestants, Quakers sought a
return to the pure Christianity of the New Testament. Unlike others,
however, they believed that the authority of the Bible was on an equal plane
with the “inner light”—the presence of Christ in each individual.131 And as a
result of those more radical views, Quakers began to resist certain legal
requirements—they refused to comply with the forms of worship required by
the Church of England, and also refused to swear oaths of allegiance to the
King.132 Both practices resulted in signiﬁcant persecution, and Quakers were
frequently subject to whippings, beatings, or imprisonment during the midseventeenth century.133 But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Quaker
position to the English authorities was their refusal to pay tithes to the
established church.
The most common argument among Quakers was that tithes were
inconsistent with the freedom of the Gospel. More speciﬁcally, they argued
that although God had originally commanded the Jews to make tithes as a
sacriﬁce, Christ had abolished such sacriﬁces and the “ceremonial law” that
commanded them. As George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, wrote in one
early tract,
Now all the tythes by the law of God and his commandment, the children of
Israel were to pay to the Levites [i.e., the temple priests] . . . . But Christ

128 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 170-81; see also id. at 181 (explaining that several Quakers
were imprisoned over the matter and that others met the same fate in subsequent years).
129 There were, however, some earlier isolated protests. See id. at 117-118 (describing instances
of small-scale opposition to church taxes in 1643 and 1646).
130 Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 421.
131 See THOMAS G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE 115-19 (1964).
132 See HUGH BARBOUR & J. WILLIAM FROST, THE QUAKERS 41-43 (1988) (noting these
Quaker practices).
133 See CHARLES FREDERICK HOLDER, THE QUAKERS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA
152-3 (1913) (estimating that by 1662 no fewer than four thousand Quakers had been jailed in England).
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Jesus . . . has ended all the oﬀerings, by oﬀering up his own body, to wit, the
oﬀering of tythes, and all other oﬀerings . . . .134

On this view, tithes were a sacrifice under the old law that Christ had
revoked. And partially for this reason, Quakers did not employ professional
clergy. Instead, they insisted that anyone ministering to the community be
supported by their own labor or by gifts of any amount from the congregation.135
The Quaker view on tithes had two important implications for their views
on church and state. First, because Quakers believed Christ had abolished
tithes, they insisted that they were obliged to disobey laws requiring them. As
one pamphleteer put it: “[I]t is a sin to pay Tythes now . . . . [I]f a man
conscientiously refuses to pay them . . . [he] will be found guiltless in the
sight of the Lord.”136 But there was also a second, more important
implication. Because tithes were sacriﬁces that had been discontinued by
Christ, any attempt on the part of government to require them was an
attempt to institute a mode of worship that God himself had annulled. For
instance, one of the earliest Quaker tracts on the subject, Francis Howgill’s
The Great Case of Tythes and Forced Maintenance, reasoned: “If God
disannulled his own command . . . for the payment of Tithes, who or what is
man that he should make a Law, as well to contradict . . . his Command[?]”137
Another Quaker put it even more forcefully:
Now for Men to make a Law to compel the Payment of Tithes, when the
Levitical Law, whereof Tithes were a Part, is abrogated by the Law of God,
what is it but to act in direct repugnancy to his Law, and to set up the Will
of Man in Opposition to the Will of God?138

For Quakers, government possessed no rightful authority to command tithes
of anyone, because to do so was to command a way of worship directly
contrary to God’s direction.
The Quaker position on tithes attracted little support in England.
Although some radicals like John Milton agreed with Quakers that tithes had

134 GEORGE FOX, The Beginning of Tythes in the Law and Ending of Tythes in the Gospel, in 5 THE
WORKS OF GEORGE FOX 259 (1831). For the earliest source claiming that tithes were a religious
observance abrogated by Christ, see JOHN SELDEN, THE HISTORIE OF TITHES 460 (1618).
135 See J. WILLIAM FROST, THE QUAKER FAMILY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 3 (1973)
(“Quakerism was a lay religion with no professional religious leaders or paid clergy.”).
136 THOMAS ELLWOOD, THE FOUNDATION OF TYTHES SHAKEN 350 (2d ed. 1720)
(emphasis omitted).
137 FRANCIS HOWGILL, THE GREAT CASE OF TYTHES AND FORCED MAINTENANCE
ONCE MORE REVIEWED 49 (1665).
138 RICHARD CLARIDGE, An Answer to a Letter About Tithes (1710), in THE LIFE AND
POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF RICHARD CLARIDGE 269, 274 (Joseph Besse ed., 1726).
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been abrogated by the New Testament,139 most Protestants—and especially
Anglicans—did not. Rather, they concluded that although Christ had ended
the ceremonies of the Jewish law, compulsory tithes in some form were
appropriate under the “moral law” that continued even after Christ.140 And
generally speaking, that was also the view of the Puritans in New England.
In 1703, inﬂuential Puritan minister Increase Mather insisted that ministers
were due an “Honourable Maintenance,” since they are “set apart for the
especial Service of God.”141 And “[i]f . . . People are unwilling to do what
Justice and Reason calls for, the Magistrate is to see them doe their duty in
this matter.”142 Yet neither the Quaker position nor the Puritan response
accurately described the other group in early America most concerned with
church taxes, and the group whose views would prove the most inﬂuential.
Baptists predated the Quakers as America’s original religious radicals.
Beginning as a loose movement of individuals in the mid-1640s, they
established their ﬁrst church in Massachusetts in 1665 and continued to grow
in numbers as the century progressed.143 Their distinctive belief, of course,
was a rejection of infant baptism—a point on which they vigorously disagreed
with the Puritans and suﬀered whippings, ﬁnes, and other punishments as a
result.144 But from the beginning they also resisted church taxes.145 And in
developing their arguments, no one was more important than a young
minister named Isaac Backus.
The son of a wealthy Connecticut farmer, Backus had undergone a
dramatic conversion while mowing his fields.146 The experience eventually led
139 See JOHN MILTON, CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE LIKELIEST MEANS TO REMOVE
HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH 6 (Aberdeen 1839) (1659) (arguing that “tithes were
ceremonial,” and that whoever “by that law brings tithes into the gospel, of necessity brings in withal
a sacriﬁce, and an altar . . . never thought on in the ﬁrst christian times [and] by an ancient[]
corruption, were brought back”).
140 For example, Richard Hooker wrote:

Albeit therefore we be now free from the Law of Moses and consequently not thereby
bound to the payment of Tithes, yet because nature has taught men to honour God with
their substance, and Scripture has left us an example of that particular proportion which
for moral considerations has been thought fittest . . . it seems in these days a question
altogether vain and superfluous whether Tithes be a matter of divine right . . . .
RICHARD HOOKER, 2 OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, bk. V, at 306 (Arthur Stephen
McGrade ed., 2013).
141 INCREASE MATHER, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE DUE TO THOSE
THAT PREACH THE GOSPEL 9-10 (1706).
142 Id. at 59.
143 CURRY, supra note 53 at 25; 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 9.
144 See 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 16-21 (describing various instances of persecution).
145 During the 1690s, Baptists cooperated with Quakers in their protest at Dartmouth and
Tiverton and also mounted an independent resistance in nearby townships. See id. at 128-62.
146 In describing his conversion, Backus reported that “I saw clearly that [my life] had been
ﬁlled up with sin. [Yet] I was enabled by divine light to see the perfect righteousness of Christ and

140

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 111

him into the ministry in dissenting churches throughout Massachusetts.147 In
that role, he encountered the oppressiveness of the church taxes regime
firsthand and became a leading opponent of the practice.148 And in an
important early tract responding to Congregationalist minister Joseph Fish—
which Backus defiantly titled A Fish Caught in His Own Net—he offered a
justification for that position which would become exceedingly popular in
many other places.
Backus began his discussion by acknowledging some common arguments
in favor of church taxes—that support for ministers was commanded by
Scripture, that laws requiring them were consistent with natural justice, and
that magistrates were obliged to act as “nursing fathers” to the church.149
Backus conceded that there was some truth to those arguments. It was true
that Christians were obliged by both the Old and New Testament to oﬀer
tithes: “The priests were supported of old out of the oﬀerings of the people;
even so hath the Lord ordained concerning his ministers now.”150 According
to Backus, however, supporters of church taxes like Fish had overlooked an
equally important point:
[T]he constant language of the divine direction was that every person of all
ranks should bring his oﬀering which God had prescribed . . . . [Y]et . . . I never
could see any proof from the Bible of any allowance of the use of coercive
power to compel any to bring their oﬀering . . . . The manner as well as matter
of this duty is ordained by [God] and he will not be mocked . . . . The Lord
says, I love judgment; I hate robbery for burnt-oﬀering.151

Unlike the Quakers, Backus agreed with most Protestants that providing
for one’s ministers was commanded by Scripture. It was an “oﬀering” to God,
a rightful “performance of worship.”152 Yet because supporting one’s minister
was in fact an act of worship, the “manner as well as the matter of this duty”
. . . my soul was drawn forth to trust in Him for salvation.” See HOVEY, supra note 73, at 39; see also
William G. McLoughlin, Introduction to ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM:
PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, at 1, 2-3 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968) [hereinafter BACKUS ON
CHURCH] (describing Backus’s conversion).
147 See HOVEY, supra note 73, at 82-93 (recounting Backus’s eventual rejection of infant
Baptism and his own rebaptism).
148 At Backus’s ﬁrst church, several of his congregants had their goods seized and auctioned
after refusing to pay the tax; another was jailed for more than a year. Backus also reported that he
himself was arrested for refusing to pay and would have gone to prison, but a sympathetic observer
intervened and paid the tax on his behalf. See McLoughlin, supra note 146, at 6-12.
149 ISAAC BACKUS, A FISH CAUGHT IN HIS OWN NET (1768), reprinted in BACKUS ON
CHURCH, supra note 146, at 171, 237-38 (emphasis omitted).
150 Id. at 240 (emphasis omitted).
151 Id. at 238-40; see also Isaiah 61:8 (King James) (“For I the Lord love judgment, I hate robbery for
burnt offering; and I will direct their work in truth, and I will make an everlasting covenant with them.”).
152 BACKUS, supra note 149, at 238 (emphasis omitted).
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were important.153 Such worship must be, as Backus put it later in the tract,
oﬀered by a “willing heart” rather than extracted by “man’s authority.”154 The
problem with church taxes was not that they required the populace to make a
heretical oﬀering as the Quakers had thought. Nor was it that such taxes
forced citizens to pay for someone else’s ministers, though that surely made
things worse. The problem was that, by compelling an act of worship—even
one endorsed by Scripture—church taxes presumed that the magistrate had
power to command what God himself had said could only be oﬀered freely.155
And in the following years, Backus and other Baptists linked their theological
arguments to themes and rhetoric that were gaining wider acceptance
throughout America.
One such example occurred in another early tract Backus wrote entitled
A Letter to a Gentleman in the Massachusetts General Assembly, Concerning Taxes
to Support Religious Worship. Writing under the pseudonym “A Countryman,”
Backus began by reciting the now-standard Baptist argument against church
taxes. Although “particular Oﬀerings . . . were enjoined upon every Man . . .
for the Support of Worship,” nothing in Scripture endorsed “any Allowance,
much more Commandment, for the use of any Force to collect it.”156 Having
made this point, however, Backus turned from the Bible to another venerable
source—John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. In response to the
argument that voluntary oﬀerings would destroy religion, Backus quoted
Locke’s well-known claim that “[t]he Care of Souls cannot belong to the civil
Magistrate, because . . . true and saving Religion consists” not in “outward
Force,” but rather in “the inward Persuasion of the Mind.”157 Locke as well as
the Bible demonstrated that church taxes were prohibited by conﬁrming that

Id. at 239 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 238-39 (citation and emphasis omitted). The phrase “willing heart” is drawn from the
Bible. See Exodus 35:5 (King James) (“Take ye from among you an oﬀering unto the Lord: whosoever
is of a willing heart, let him bring it, an oﬀering of the Lord; gold, and silver, and brass . . . .”).
155 Backus was one of the ﬁrst Baptists in America to argue that church taxes were objectionable
because they attempted to coerce an otherwise proper religious observance. But notably, a version
of the same idea had been oﬀered roughly a century earlier by none other than Roger Williams, New
England’s original religious dissenter. Writing in 1652 in a tract entitled The Hirelings Ministry None
of Christs, Williams argued: “Let the Townes, the Parishes, and divisions of people . . . be
undisturbed by any civil Sword, from their consciences and worships . . . and let their maintenance
[for clergy] be by Tenths and Fifths, or how they freely please. Only let it be their soul[‘]s choice
and no inforcing Sword . . . .” See ROGER WILLIAMS, THE HIRELINGS MINISTRY NONE OF
CHRISTS, OR, A DISCOURSE TOUCHING THE PROPAGATING THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST JESUS ¶
7 (1652) (emphasis omitted).
156 ISAAC BACKUS, A LETTER TO A GENTLEMAN IN THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, CONCERNING TAXES TO SUPPORT RELIGIOUS WORSHIP 4 (1771).
157 Id. at 6. For the original quote, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
(1689), reprinted in LOCKE, supra note 105, at 13.
153
154
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Christ’s kingdom and the worship it demanded “do[] not receive [their]
support from earthly Power, but from Truth.”158
The same kind of argument also appears in Backus’s now-famous tract An
Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty. Written in Backus’s capacity as “Agent
for the Baptists in New England,” the tract has been called “the most
complete and well-rounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church and
state in the eighteenth century.”159 It began by reciting familiar ideas drawn
from Locke: “[I]t appears to us that the true diﬀerence and exact limits
between ecclesiastical and civil governments is this, That the church is armed
with light and truth . . . while the state is armed with the sword . . . .”160 The
tract went on to claim that Massachusetts’s church tax system improperly
“blended together” those governments, producing horriﬁc suﬀering among
Baptists and others as a result.161 It concluded by bringing both themes
together in a crescendo of revolutionary proportions:
Therefore the whole matter very much turns upon this point, viz., Whether our
civil legislature are in truth our representatives in religious affairs or not? As God
has always claimed it as his prerogative to appoint who shall be his ministers and
how they shall be supported, so under the Gospel the people’s communications
to Christ’s ministers and members are called sacrifices with which God is well
pleased . . . . And what government on earth ever had, or ever can have, any
power to make or execute any laws to appoint and enforce sacrifices to God!162

It is worth noting the similarities between this argument and later attacks
on church taxes like Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance. Like the New
England Baptists, Madison began his Remonstrance by invoking the Lockean
insight that religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence.”163 And because that was so, he reasoned, attempts by the
legislature to mandate church taxes “exceed[ed] . . . their authority,” by
coercing an act of worship that could only be oﬀered freely: “It is the duty of
every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes
BACKUS, supra note 156, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
McLoughlin, supra note 146, at 41-42.
ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AGAINST THE
OPPRESSION OF THE PRESENT DAY (1773), in BACKUS ON CHURCH, supra note 146, at 308, 315
(emphasis omitted).
161 Id. at 316, 325-30.
162 Id. at 332. In making this point, Backus cited two biblical passages. See Philippians 4:18 (King
James) (“But I have all, and abound: I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which
were sent from you, an odour of a sweet smell, a sacriﬁce acceptable, wellpleasing to God.”); Hebrews
13:16-18 (King James) (“But to do good and to communicate forget not: for with such sacriﬁces God
is well pleased.”).
163 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 7
THORPE, supra note 44, at 3814).
158
159
160
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to be acceptable to [H]im.”164 To be sure, Madison chose the genteel language
of “homage” rather than the gritty biblical term “sacriﬁce” in keeping with
his more rationalist sensibilities. But the underlying point was the same.
Church taxes were unacceptable because they amounted to a coerced religious
observance that no legislature could rightly command. And that idea arose
directly from a marriage of Locke’s arguments about the essence of religion
and the power of the magistrate and Baptist convictions about the voluntary
nature of tithes and oﬀerings.
The use of Locke by Baptists and others also underscores another
important point. In tracing the intellectual history of the Establishment
Clause, several scholars—most notably Noah Feldman—have emphasized the
importance of John Locke in the development of arguments against church
taxes.165 And as a general matter, that emphasis is well-taken. Locke’s ideas
were exceedingly popular during this period, and played a key role in
supplementing Baptist arguments against church taxes and pushing those
arguments into the mainstream.166 But it is misleading to assert without
qualiﬁer, as Feldman does, that the Founding generation’s reliance on Locke
yielded a widespread belief that “conscience would be violated if citizens were
required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose beliefs they
disagreed.”167 For one thing, Baptists and other religious dissenters did not
actually object to funding other people’s religious schools, nor did they object
to requiring people to fund theirs.168 But even more basically, the fact is that
claims about paying for disagreeable religion were not ultimately controlling
in arguments against church taxes.
To understand the point, consider just one example from the writings of
Baptist minister John Leland, an inﬂuential ﬁgure in both New England and
Virginia whom Feldman describes as “follow[ing] straightforwardly Lockean
lines.”169 In a tract entitled The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, Leland pointed
out that Connecticut’s church tax scheme, which was similar to
Massachusetts’s in every major respect, was oﬀensive because it failed to

Id. (emphasis added).
See Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 348-51 (tracing the origins of the Establishment
Clause and identifying Locke as one of the main sources of arguments against church taxes).
166 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
35-36 (1992) (identifying John Locke along with Cato’s Letters as providing “the most authoritative
statement of the nature of political liberty” during the Founding period).
167 Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 351.
168 See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text (documenting Baptist support for funding
religious schools in Virginia); see also infra notes 202–212, 236–239, 245, 369–372 and accompanying
text (documenting Baptist support for government funding of their own schools).
169 Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 387.
164
165
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provide exemptions for “heathens, deists, . . . Jews” and others.170 “Is it the
duty of a Jew to support the religion of Jesus Christ, when he really believes
that he was an imposter?” asked Leland, adding that “[t]hese things want [of]
better conﬁrmation.”171 Yet, Leland continued, that was not actually the heart
of the matter. Even “[i]f we suppose that it is the duty of all . . . to support
the Protestant Christian religion,” there was a more basic problem: “[H]ow
comes it to pass, that human legislatures have a right to force [people] so to
do?”172 Leland elaborated:
I now call for an instance, where Jesus Christ . . . ever gave orders to, or
intimated, that the civil powers on earth ought to force people to observe the
rules and doctrine of the gospel. . . . That it is the duty of men . . . to
communicate to him that teaches, is beyond controversy; but that it is the
province of the civil law to force them to do so, is denied.173

By acknowledging that “it is the duty of all men . . . to communicate to
him that teaches,” Leland was adopting the usual Baptist line that paying
ministers with the aim of supporting the Gospel was an act of worship—a
“sacriﬁce[] with which the Lord is well pleased.”174 He then asserted, drawing
on Lockean themes, that commanding such an observance was not within the
magistrate’s authority: “[T]hat it is the province of civil law to force them to
do so, is denied.”175 Of course, coercing Jews or other non-Christians to oﬀer
that kind of sacriﬁce was even more objectionable—a “piece of Oppression
that would make even a moral Heathen blush” as Isaac Backus put it.176 But
the objection about paying for disagreeable religion was nested within the
claim about coerced tithes. Government had no authority to command
payments solely to ﬁnance religion, either one’s own or someone else’s. But
that was not because citizens possessed a freestanding right to avoid
subsidizing religious activity. Rather, it was because church taxes purported
to authorize what Locke had proven magistrates lacked power to do—namely,
to require a religious observance by force. And indeed, understanding that

170 JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE, AND THEREFORE,
RELIGIOUS OPINIONS NOT COGNIZABLE BY LAW (1791), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE
LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 177, 187 (1845).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See John Leland, Which has Done the Most Mischief in the World, the Kings-Evil or Priest-Craft?, reprinted
in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 170, at 484, 494 (“To honor the
Lord with our substance . . . and communicate all good things to those who teach the word, are sacrifices with
which the Lord is well pleased.”).
175 LELAND, supra note 170, at 187.
176 BACKUS, supra note 156, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
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point is crucial for understanding two aspects of the history that have often
been a source of confusion.
The first involves the relationship between church taxes and conscience.
In arguing against church taxes, proponents of religious liberty frequently
contended that commanding such taxes infringed on liberty of conscience.177
But it is important to realize that for these people, that did not mean
conscience was violated anytime government subsidized religion—the idea
animating many invocations of the concept today.178 Rather, church taxes
infringed on conscience because they coerced a religious duty—an act of
worship—instead of leaving the matter to each citizen’s private judgment.
According to Backus, “[T]he free communications of our carnal things to
Christ’s ministers . . . concerns the exercise of a good conscience . . . as prayer
and praise do, for they are both called sacrifices.”179 And indeed, that is why
Madison and others frequently claimed that church taxes were not just
improper religious establishments, but also inconsistent with free exercise.180
By requiring tithes on the part of the citizenry, church taxes commanded an
act of worship contrary to conscience (violating the right of free exercise),
while also implying that government had power to control conscience and
coerce such acts (echoing the oppressiveness of prior religious establishments).
The second point—and perhaps the more important one—concerns the
scope of Founding-era objections to paying for religion. In defending their
religious establishments, critics in New England frequently accused Baptists
and Quakers of advocating anarchy. According to one writer, complaints
against church taxes applied “with equal force against paying any tax for the
support of civil government,” and many others agreed.181 That same
177 See Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 351 (noting that complaints about church
taxes sounding in liberty of conscience “achieved broad acceptance”).
178 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 616 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Establishment Clause “expresses the Constitution’s special concern
that freedom of conscience not be compromised by government taxing and spending in support of
religion”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (ﬁnding that “[t]he
right to conscience, in the religious sphere” is “implicated when the government requires individuals
to support the practices of a faith with which they do not agree”).
179 BACKUS, supra note 160, at 342. For an illuminating discussion of the ways that Backus and
other Founding-era writers equated liberty of conscience with a “right of private judgment,” see
NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91-113 (2012).
180 See MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 59-60 (arguing that the assessment infringed
on “the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of
conscience”). For additional examples of this same argument, see supra notes 81–83 and
accompanying text.
181 “Irenaeus,” Messrs. Draper and Folsom, INDEP. LEDGER, & AM. ADVERTISER, Apr. 24, 1780;
see also ELIHU HALL, THE PRESENT WAY OF THE COUNTRY IN MAINTAINING THE GOSPEL
MINISTRY BY A PUBLICK RATE OR TAX IS LAWFUL, EQUITABLE & AGREEABLE TO THE GOSPEL
26 (1749) (arguing that church taxes were “as lawfully Transacted as any other civil temporal
Covenant” and ”like [a] Tax for building a School-House”); JOSEPH FISH, THE EXAMINER
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sentiment was later repeated by famed Massachusetts jurist Theophilus
Parsons. According to Parsons, the Baptist position “seems to mistake a man’s
conscience for his money,” and as a result “den[ied] the state a right of levying
and of appropriating the money of the citizens.”182
Backus and others met these arguments by restating their position, but
also by explaining the limited scope of their objection. “Many try to elude
the force of [our arguments] by saying that the taxes . . . for the support of
ministers, are of a civil nature,” Backus observed.183 “But it is certain that they
[i.e., those receiving church taxes] call themselves ministers of Christ; and
the taxes now referred to are to support them under that name . . . .”184 And
“such communications are called sacrifices to God more than once in the New
Testament.”185 Unlike ordinary taxes, in other words, church taxes were not
designed to further any of the goods governments had been entrusted to
protect.186 Rather, their singular task was to ﬁnance religious worship—to
support ministers “under that name.” And because that was so, such taxes
were indistinguishable from a coerced tithe—they were an oﬀering of money,
taken by force, solely to support a religious function. According to Backus,
the diﬀerence between church taxes and other taxes was “so great a diﬀerence
. . . as there is between sacrifices to God and the ordinances of man.”187
Backus was not alone in distinguishing church taxes from other kinds of
taxes by pointing to the ways that only the former were specially designed to
ﬁnance religion. The same argument was made repeatedly by others.
According to John Leland, the diﬀerence between church taxes and other civil
rates was that only the ﬁrst “forc[ed] people to part with their money for
religious purposes.”188 As Leland explained elsewhere,
[T]he Lord ordained in the New Testament, that those who preach the gospel
should live of it. God has ordained it, but has not ordained that rulers should
enforce it. Whenever, therefore, money is given for religious purposes, it is

EXAMINED 56 (1771) (arguing that church taxes were “acts of the civil state—done for its own
utility,” and indistinguishable from other “civil contracts . . . the violations of which neither are nor
can be corrected by any power but the magistrate” (emphasis omitted)).
182 Barnes v. First Par. in Falmouth, 6 Mass. 401, 408 (1810). Parsons continued: “[I]f any
individual can lawfully withhold his contribution, because he dislikes the appropriation, the
authority of the state to levy taxes would be annihilated.” Id. at 409.
183 Backus, supra note 73, at 216-17.
184 Id. at 217.
185 Id.
186 See BACKUS, supra note 160, at 315 (“[T]he state is armed with the sword to guard the peace and
civil rights of all persons and societies and to punish those who violate the same.” (emphasis omitted)).
187 Id. at 339.
188 LELAND, supra note 170, at 188.
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given in obedience to the law of God, and not in obedience to the laws of
men: I mean when it is rightly given.189

Likewise, notwithstanding their disagreements with Baptists on other
matters, Quakers took the same position. “Tithes are not imposed in the
manner of a civil Tax,” wrote Quaker Joseph Phipps, because “[t]he Intent of
imposing them is, to support religious Ministers in the pursuit of religious
Duties. Being not required for a civil, but a religious Purpose, the Payment
of them is to be treated as a Matter of a religious Concern.”190 These writers
all acknowledged that generally speaking, paying taxes was fully appropriate
and part of a duty “to render unto Caesar the things that are his.”191 But they
contended that allowing government “to take [property] away with the sword,
under a religious mask,” was something totally diﬀerent.192 And the logic of
that position helps explain why even Quakers and Baptists—the most radical
proponents of religious freedom at the Founding besides people like James
Madison—did not object to government funding for religious schools either.
Consider just a few incidents that illustrate their position. Quakers were
long concerned that sending their children to other people’s schools would
have a corrupting inﬂuence. As a result, they eventually began their own
schools and sought government support for them. In 1786, Quakers in Lynn,
Massachusetts successfully lobbied the town to refund tax money they had
paid toward the local school in order to fund their own school instead.193 But
they did not stop at seeking a tax refund. A decade later, the town provided
freestanding ﬁnancial support for a Quaker school, presumably with their
approval.194 The same was true of a Quaker school in Bolton, which was
“reimbursed regularly by the town . . . for almost the entire money expended
for education.”195 Apparently, Quakers in Massachusetts did not object to
government funding for their schools, even if those funds might be collected
from others.
Quakers elsewhere in New England displayed a similar attitude. In 1791,
the local school committee in Providence, Rhode Island recommended that

189 See JOHN LELAND, A Blow at the Root: Being a Fashionable Fast-Day Sermon, in THE
WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 170, at 234, 247.
190 JOSEPH PHIPPS, BRIEF REMARKS ON THE COMMON ARGUMENTS NOW USED IN
SUPPORT OF DIVERS ECCLESIASTICAL IMPOSITIONS IN THIS NATION, ESPECIALLY AS THEY
RELATE TO DISSENTERS 6 (1769). Phipps’s tract was written in England, but later reprinted in
Philadelphia by a prominent Quaker printer named Joseph Crukshank.
191 BACKUS, supra note 160, at 317.
192 ISAAC BACKUS, POLICY, AS WELL AS HONESTY, FORBIDS THE USE OF SECULAR FORCE
IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (1779), reprinted in BACKUS ON CHURCH, supra note 146, at 370, 375.
193 ZORA KLAIN, EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF QUAKERS 149 (1928).
194 Id. Klain notes that this support for the school was withdrawn “years afterward.” Id.
195 Id. at 148.
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schools be set up throughout the city and funded out of the town treasury.196
Recognizing that Quakers had already created a local school, however, the
committee declared that the Quaker school ought to receive a share of “the
money raised for schooling” according to “the proportion . . . of scholars in
their school” compared to the total number of children being educated.197
Moreover, the report continued, although the Quaker school would be open to
authorities for “inspection and advice,” no official was to interfere with “the
address or manners of the Society, in relation to their religious opinions.”198
The committee’s recommendations in Providence ultimately failed to
produce action by the city council, despite having received a majority vote at
the town meeting.199 But Quaker support for the proposal was unequivocal.
Indeed, it became their oﬃcial position. In 1801, the Quarterly Meeting of
Quakers in Rhode Island instructed members to remove their children from
local schools, set up their own, and seek to “obtain their proportion of school
Moneys in the Respective Towns, According to their Assessments.”200 And
the behavior of Quakers in other places around the country indicates a similar
attitude.201 Although Quakers rigorously opposed church taxes, the evidence
strongly suggests they had no qualms about seeking money for their schools
even if others might be taxed to pay for them.
Evidence related to Baptists in this period points toward a similar
conclusion. In 1764, Baptists founded Rhode Island College—later Brown
University—the ﬁrst Baptist institution of higher learning in America.202
196 See Report of the School Committee in 1791, reprinted in THOMAS B. STOCKWELL, A
HISTORY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN RHODE ISLAND 1636 TO 1876, at 146, 146 (1876).
197 Id. at 147. The report stated that government oﬃcials were “to give orders on the town
treasury” to support the Quaker school “as in the case of other schools.” Id.
198 Id.
199 According to Stockwell, the council’s failure to carry out the proposal stemmed from a fear
of sectarian education. See id. at 148. But as historian Charles Carroll points out, a similar proposal
was adopted again just a few years later and yet was also met with inaction. The explanation, he
suggests, stemmed from the failure of either proposal to actually recommend a speciﬁc tax or other
source of revenue to fund the measures. See CHARLES CARROLL, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN RHODE
ISLAND 56-57 (1918).
200 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 195. The context of the instruction clearly indicates that the
phrase “their Assessments” refers to the respective assessments of the towns—as in Providence—
not to the Quakers’ individual assessments.
201 See infra notes 291–298 and accompanying text (documenting the funding of religious
schools in Pennsylvania, seemingly without Quaker resistance); infra notes 285–290 (noting funding
for religious education in New Jersey and Delaware, both founded as Quaker colonies); THOMAS
WOODY, QUAKER EDUCATION IN THE COLONY AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY 366 (1923) (noting
broad Quaker participation in school funding in New Jersey until 1866).
202 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 491. In keeping with Baptist piety, the college required
every student to attend prayer each morning and evening and forbade any student to publicly deny
the validity of the Bible or engage in licentious behavior. See REUBEN A. GUILD, EARLY HISTORY
OF BROWN UNIVERSITY 265 (1897). Yet unusual for its day, the leaders of the college also stated
that no student could be “molested in the free enjoyment of their . . . Christian faith, by ridicule,

2020]

Church Taxes

149

During the Revolutionary War, the college housed American militia men and
was later converted into a hospital for French soldiers ﬁghting alongside the
Continental Army.203 However, the building was badly damaged rendering it
more or less unusable for continuing the college’s religious mission.204 In 1786,
its president James Manning sought assistance from Congress for rents and
repairs.205 Manning was a prominent Baptist and had personally assisted Isaac
Backus in petitioning the Continental Congress to condemn Massachusetts’s
church tax regime.206 Yet having expressed those convictions just a few years
earlier, neither Manning nor any other Baptist recorded misgivings about
seeking money from the government for their religious institution. And in
1800, Congress granted their repeated requests, awarding $2,800 to the college
to repair the ediﬁce—the main university building where instruction as well
as the school’s oﬃcial daily prayers took place.207
A similar situation occurred elsewhere. In the district of Maine, several
colleges were supported with land grants and also with a tax on banks.208 The
year after the tax was passed, Baptists authored a petition to the legislature
demanding similar beneﬁts for a school of their own. They ﬁrst requested
“the same aid that has been aﬀorded to Williamstown and Bowdoin colleges
as relates to grants of land.”209 But even more strikingly, they also sought
“their proportion of the tax upon the banks,” in order “to have an institution
at which their children may be educated.”210 Nor was this attitude limited to
funding for colleges. As we have already seen, Baptists in Virginia approved
of funding schemes for religious secondary schools.211 And as the evidence
below outlines, Baptists in Maryland and elsewhere also sought (and often
obtained) tax support for their religious primary schools, too.212

sneers, scoﬃng, inﬁdel suggestions, or any other means.” While decidedly Christian, the college was
clearly organized with “the grand object in view” being that “Christians of every denomination shall
. . . enjoy free liberty.” Id. at 271.
203 GUILD, supra note 202, at 294.
204 Id. at 337-38.
205 Id. at 333-34.
206 Manning likely co-authored a memorial that Backus presented to the Continental Congress
recounting Baptist persecution under Massachusetts’ regime. See id. at 278-80.
207 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 770. For the text of Congress’s act appropriating the
funds, see GUILD, supra note 202, at 334.
208 EDWARD W. HALL, HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN MAINE 44-46 (1903). Land
grants were provided to Bowdoin College beginning in 1796. Id. at 44-45. The bank tax began in
1814 and provided funding for Bowdoin, Harvard, and Williams College. Id. at 45.
209 Id. at 100.
210 Id.
211 See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., infra notes 235–239, 245 and accompanying text (noting Baptist support for funding
religious primary schools in Maryland); infra notes 369–372 and accompanying text (noting Baptist
acceptance of funding for their schools in Connecticut).
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Neither Quakers nor Baptists in early America objected to government
funding for religious schools, even where the money might be provided
through coercive taxation. They did not explain why that support did not
trigger the same objections that church taxes did. But a ready explanation
ﬂows from their argument that church taxes were a coerced religious
observance. Church taxes demanded a religious sacriﬁce, because they
commanded an oﬀering for the sole purpose of ﬁnancing worship. But the
same was not true of government support for public goods like education,
even if recipients also used the money for religion. And if even Quakers and
Baptists—the most radical supporters of religious liberty at the Founding—
did not see funding for religious schools as a problem, it stands to reason that
others probably did not either. To explore that question in full, however, we
must examine the practices of the Founding generation more generally.
II. CHURCH TAXES AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Between the Revolutionary War and the decade after the adoption of the
Establishment Clause, eight states besides Virginia either outlawed church
taxes or rejected proposals to require them. This Part examines the practice
of those states and the practice of the federal government following the
ratiﬁcation of the Establishment Clause and draws a simple conclusion. In
each state that rejected church taxes, funding for religious schools followed
shortly thereafter—a practice that was also replicated by the federal
government following the adoption of the Establishment Clause. We cannot
know for certain why majorities across the country made those decisions. But
the pervasive practice of funding religious schools—seemingly without
controversy—provides an additional reason to believe that objections to
paying for religion were limited to instances where funding was provided
solely to support religious worship and thus resembled a coerced tithe.
A. The Former Anglican Colonies
Like Virginia, other states throughout the South had Anglican
establishments prior to the revolution that included some form of compulsory
church taxes.213 After American independence, each of these states—North
Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland, and Georgia—ended the practice. In
each, however, funding for religious schools continued.
The most extensive debate took place in Maryland. In 1776, the state enacted
a declaration of rights that forbade taxes to support “any particular ministry,” but
left open the possibility of “a general and equal tax for the support of the
213

See CURRY, supra note 53, at 148-58 (describing these state establishments).
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[C]hristian religion.”214 Like Virginia’s general assessment proposal, that scheme
included elements of choice. It provided each taxpayer the ability to direct
money to his chosen church, or to benefit the poor within his denomination, or
to support “the poor in general” within his county.215 Moreover, when the
legislature introduced a law in 1785 enabling the tax, it also included a complete
exemption for Jews, Muslims, and any other non-Christians.216
Early in the controversy, supporters of religious liberty sometimes
appealed to broad claims about paying for disagreeable religion.217 Yet like
Jeﬀerson’s argument a decade earlier, that claim faced signiﬁcant diﬃculties.
The Maryland assessment wholly exempted non-Christians from the tax,
leaving no doubt that the argument about paying for disagreeable religion did
not apply to them. Moreover, although the bill did apply to Quakers and
Mennonites—who objected to paying their own ministers on principle—it
explicitly allowed them to direct their money to the poor.218 As a result, one
writer reasoned, “No real injury can possibly be occasioned by the law to any
society . . . . The Ministers, or the Poor of every respective society, or the
Poor at large, if any will have it so, are to enjoy what is contributed.”219
Supporters of religious liberty in Maryland responded with a variety of
arguments.220 Yet here too, many invoked the idea that the assessment
amounted to a coerced religious observance. For instance, one writer noted that
the Roman Empire “compelled the Christians to worship their idols, and killed
those who refused,” then drew an analogy to the general assessment: “[t]o
compel a person to worship an idol, contrary to the dictates of his conscience,
or to compel a person to pay money, against which he scruples in his conscience,
is much like one and the same thing.”221 Another writer calling himself “Simon
Pure” offered a similar argument, suggesting that the assessment was
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. 33, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 44, at 1686, 1689 (emphasis added).
Id.
See An Act to Lay a General Tax for the Support of Ministers of the Gospel of All Societies of
Christians Within this State, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Jan. 21, 1785. The bill also limited eligible
churches to those that were legally registered, composed of at least thirty adult males, and had a
minister contracted to serve for at least one year. See also John Corbin Rainbolt, The Struggle to Define
“Religious Liberty” in Maryland 1776–85, 17 J. CHURCH & STATE 443, 448 (1975).
217 For instance, one early Baptist Remonstrance insisted that “[t]hose who receive of their
spiritual things should minister to [their clergy’s] wants and necessities, and those . . . who do not
receive a beneﬁt, should not be compelled to pay them.” See Ministers and Messengers of the
Churches of the Baptist Denomination on the Eastern Shore, To the Honorable the General Assembly
of the State of Maryland, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Jan. 28, 1785.
218 See An Act to Lay a General Tax for the Support of Ministers of the Gospel of All Societies of
Christians Within this State, supra note 216.
219 “Agrestis,” For the Maryland Journal, &c., MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Feb. 18, 1785.
220 For instance, they argued that the assessment was a poll tax prohibited by the state’s
constitution, and that it would place an intolerable ﬁnancial burden on the populace. See Rainbolt,
supra note 216, at 455-57.
221 “An Inhabitant of Maryland,” Msrrs. Printers, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Feb. 18, 1785.
214
215
216
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impermissible since “[t]he great Creator of all things saith, expressly, that he
delighteth not in robbery for burnt offerings.”222 Still another argued—just as
Madison would about three pence—that because the assessment gave
government officials power to “institut[e] . . . public worship,” it followed that
they could “become sole judges . . . of the particular modes also, which shall be
hereafter observed.”223
The Maryland legislature voted down the assessment proposal in
November of 1785.224 And although it is diﬃcult to tell which arguments were
decisive, social unrest over taxes suggests that those concerns may have played
the dominant role.225 Nonetheless, the argument about coerced religious
observance explains why religious dissenters in Maryland condemned the
assessment even though it did not require anyone to pay for disagreeable
religious activity. But even more, it also oﬀers a possible explanation for why
opponents of church taxes did not object to the state’s continued funding of
religious schools.
Three years before the assessment controversy, the Maryland legislature
had chartered Washington College, a school on the eastern shore.226 The
college’s charter provided that students and faculty would be drawn from “all
religious denominations and persuasions,” but it also clearly stated that the
school was authorized to instruct students in subjects “useful . . . for the
service of their country in church and state,” including divinity.227 And just a
few months before the assessment battle, the legislature appropriated £1,250
“as a donation by the public” to the college, to be renewed annually.228
Given the vigorous debate over the assessment, one might expect that state
support for Washington College would have ended soon after the bill was
defeated. In fact, however, something more like the opposite was true. After
the assessment bill was voted down in 1785, the legislature left the annual
appropriation for Washington College untouched for more than a decade.229
Moreover, when it finally did alter the arrangement, it reallocated £800 of the
tax revenue to five academies offering general secondary education,230 at least

“Simon Pure,” To the Marylander, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Mar. 1, 1785.
“Philo,” To the Sincere Friends of Liberty and Religion, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Jan. 28, 1785.
See Rainbolt, supra note 216, at 450.
See id. at 457-58 (noting that signiﬁcant tax increases led to a taxpayers’ revolt the same
year the general assessment was defeated).
226 See Act of Apr. 1782, ch. VIII, 1782 Md. Laws.
227 Id. pmbl., § IV.
228 Act of Nov. 1784, ch. VII, § II, 1784 Md. Laws. The funds were to be used to pay the salaries
of the faculty, and drawn from taxes on marriage licenses and liquor, and from local fines. Id. §§ III-V.
229 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 223 (noting that this funding scheme for Washington College
remained unchanged until 1798).
230 Act of Jan. 20, 1799, ch. CVII, §§ 3-4, 1798 Md. Laws.
222
223
224
225
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three of which included religious instruction and worship in the curriculum.231
And this example is hardly unique. St. John’s College, a non-denominational
school in Annapolis, benefited from a similar annual grant of £1,750 drawn
from taxes and fines in the western shore.232 That funding continued long after
the assessment controversy, despite the fact that St. John’s encouraged its
students to attend religious worship, at least where it was consistent with a
student’s upbringing or authorized by parental consent.233
The same was true of religious schools oﬀering basic education in
Maryland. In 1810, Maryland passed a law explicitly banning church taxes.234
A few years later, the legislature enacted a tax on banks and designated the
revenue to fund “a general system of free schools” throughout the state.235
Again, religious schools beneﬁted without objection. In 1819, the legislature
explicitly provided that commissioners in Baltimore were to pay portions of
the school fund to three religious entities.236 The ﬁrst two—the Male Sunday
School Societies of Baltimore and the Female Union Society for the
Promotion of Sabbath Schools—were aﬃliated with various Protestant
churches that provided free education to poor children on Sundays, often
within church buildings.237 The third entity—the Orphaline Charity
School—was a Roman Catholic organization dedicated to educating female

231 Washington Academy possessed a “spacious hall for prayers [and] sermons.” BERNARD
CHRISTIAN STEINER, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN MARYLAND 40 (1894). Charlotte Hall provided
for the “liberal and pious education of the youth . . . to better them for their duties either in regard
to church or state.” CHARLOTTE HALL SCHOOL 1939 SENTINEL YEARBOOK (1939). And Samuel
Knox, a Presbyterian minister and principal of Frederick County School, declared that teachers ought
to “begin and end the business of the day with a short and suitable prayer” and read devotional
literature to students. See SAMUEL KNOX, AN ESSAY ON THE BEST SYSTEM OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION, ADAPTED TO THE GENIUS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 106
(1799). One historian credits Knox as the catalyst for the 1798 law. See STEINER, supra, at 43.
232 Act of Nov. 1784, ch. 37, § XIX-XXII, 1784 Md. Laws. The legislature also declared that
Washington College and St. John’s would collectively become the University of Maryland but the
plan was not carried out. See GABEL, supra note 98, at 223.
233 See Act of Nov. 1784, ch. 37, § 2, 1784 Md. Laws (declaring that students would not be strictly
required to attend religious worship, but that such a requirement could be imposed when “they have
been educated in, or have the consent and approbation of their parents or guardians to attend”).
234 See Act of Jan. 7, 1810, ch. CLXVII, 1809 Md. Laws (outlawing church taxes in Maryland).
235 See Act of Jan. 27, 1814, ch. 122, § 10, 1813 Md. Laws 113, 116; see also STEINER, supra note
231, at 55 (describing the law).
236 See Res. 24, 1818 Gen. Assemb., Dec. Sess. (Md. 1819).
237 See TERRY D. BILHARTZ, URBAN RELIGION AND THE SECOND GREAT AWAKENING:
CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN EARLY NATIONAL BALTIMORE 105-06 (1986) (outlining the church
aﬃliations of these organizations).
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orphans.238 All three provided religious instruction and worship, but received
funds as a matter of course.239
Nor was this the only instance of state support. In 1826, the legislature
passed a similar measure concerning the school fund for Frederick County,
declaring explicitly that a portion of the funds were to be dispersed to the
pastor of St. John’s Catholic Church for the use of the church’s female free
school.240 Likewise, in 1816, the legislature authorized an additional direct tax
in ﬁve counties to support the education of poor children, stating that those
funds should be used to send children to “the nearest and most convenient
school,” apparently without regard to its religious persuasion.241
Why didn’t those who opposed the general assessment in Maryland also
object to funding religious schools, especially denominational ones? One
possibility is that they disapproved of paying for education that included
religious worship but accepted it as a matter of practical necessity. Churches
were a main source of education in this period, so perhaps supporters of
religious liberty acquiesced to funding them even while disagreeing in
principle. But as far as I have been able to discover, the historical record is
devoid of evidence supporting that theory—either in Maryland or anywhere
else. Although the funding programs for religious colleges in Maryland did
face criticism, those criticisms “derived from the resentment of the high fees
and of the aristocratic tone of the schools, rather than their religious
ingredients.”242 Moreover, as in Virginia, the religious schools receiving
funding enjoyed the public support of prominent citizens who had fought to
defeat the assessment.243 For instance, John Carroll, America’s ﬁrst Catholic
bishop and a leading voice for religious freedom in the state, sat on the board
of both Washington College and St. John’s and publicly praised their
endeavors.244 The same was true of funding for religious primary schools,
which enjoyed support from Baptists and others who had previously resisted
church taxes.245
238 See SAMUEL WINDSOR BROWN, THE SECULARIZATION OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: AS
SHOWN BY STATE LEGISLATION, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 45 (1912).
239 See BILHARTZ, supra note 237, at 106-07 (noting that curriculum at the free schools included
memorizing Bible verses, answering questions from the catechism of the respective church, and
attending worship).
240 Act of Feb. 15, 1826, ch. 72, § 2, 1825 Md. Laws 55, 56.
241 See Act of Feb. 5, 1817, ch. 244, § 5, 1816 Md. Laws 196, 197.
242 THOMAS O’BRIEN HANLEY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND RELIGION: MARYLAND
1770–1800, at 218 (1971).
243 See, e.g., supra note 96 (noting Caleb Wallace’s opposition to Virginia’s religious
establishment and subsequent support for funding of Transylvania Seminary).
244 See HANLEY, supra note 242, at 218 (noting a letter Carroll wrote to the Visitors and Governors
of Washington College commending the school’s “diffusion of liberal and tolerating principles”).
245 BILHARTZ, supra note 237, at 106 (noting Baptist support for Baltimore’s religious free schools).
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The argument about coerced religious observance oﬀers a more likely
explanation. In arguing against the general assessment, defenders of religious
liberty in Maryland asserted that government “ought not to interfere with
any man’s faith, or practice,” even if that interference involved nothing more
than requiring citizens to tithe to their own churches.246 The general
assessment demanded money for the speciﬁc purpose of ﬁnancing religious
worship, and as such was indistinguishable from a coerced tithe—it was
“robbery for burnt-oﬀerings,” as Simon Pure had put it.247 But the same was
not true of funding to support goods like education, even if those being
funded might also engage in religion. And the evidence from the other
southern states points toward a similar conclusion.
In North Carolina, church taxes ended unceremoniously in 1776 with the
passage of a new state constitution.248 The change was supported by Baptists
and also by the state’s large Quaker population.249 According to one
contemporary observer, the inhabitants of North Carolina had “all in general
imbibed a Quaker like abhorrence of Hirelings” well before the revolution.250
But again, no one seems to have thought the ban on church taxes forbade
funding for religious education. In 1784, the legislature transferred ownership
of a decaying Episcopal church that had been built by taxpayer funds to
Science Hall, a Presbyterian academy.251 Several years later, it granted a
surplus of £250 in local tax revenue to Warrenton Academy, a nondenominational school,252 in what was likely “the ﬁrst instance in the history
of the State of local taxation for schools.”253

“Simon Pure,” supra note 222.
Id.
See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 44, at 2787, 2793
(declaring that no citizen would be “obliged to pay for the purchase of any glebe, or the building of
any house of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry”).
249 See STEPHEN BEAUREGARD WEEKS, CHURCH AND STATE IN NORTH CAROLINA 28-29
(1893) (noting Baptist success in the colony); see also id. at 50-51 (documenting Quaker resistance to
church taxes in the state).
250 CURRY, supra note 53, at 61.
251 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 236 n.27 (noting the school’s Presbyterian aﬃliation and that
the church building had been paid for with taxpayer funds); see also 24 THE STATE RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA: LAWS 1777–1788, at 606 (Walter Clark, C.J., ed., 1905) (documenting the
property transfer to the school, described in the act as “an academy in the neighborhood of
Hillsborough”).
252 See An Act Respecting the Warrenton Academy, ch. XL, 1805 N.C. Sess. Laws 27. The same
year the funds were provided, Warrenton Academy declared: “It shall be earnestly recommended to
the principal to cause the students to meet at the Academy at twelve o’clock on every Sunday, by the
ringing of the bell, and to deliver to them a discourse upon some moral or religious subject.” See
CHARLES L. COON, NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES: 1790–1840, at xxxvi (1915).
253 See 2 1896–1897 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION 1393 (Washington
D.C., Government Printing Oﬃce 1898).
246
247
248
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A similar pattern occurred in South Carolina. In 1778 the state enacted a
new constitution that ended church taxes.254 But in 1811, the state provided
$300 per year to multiple free schools within each county—that is, schools
providing cost-free education to poor white children.255 Many of those
schools were religious.256 Likewise, during this period the legislature
appropriated funds for several colleges, including Mount Zion Academy and
the College of Charleston, both of which had denominational ties.257
The process of ending church taxes in Georgia was more gradual. After
the Revolution, Georgia ended exclusive ﬁnancial support for the Anglican
church.258 But other kinds of support continued. In 1784, the legislature
passed a resolution for “promoting religion and piety” that provided aid to
build and repair churches in the state.259 The next year, it passed a general
assessment much like the one that had been debated in Virginia, though it
seems never to have been enforced.260 It was not until 1798 that the state’s
third constitution ﬁnally outlawed “tiths, taxes, or any other rate” in support
of religious worship.261 But as in other states, the passage of the ban on church
taxes did not end support for religious academies. According to one source,
at least thirty-six academies—many if not all of them religious—received
state funds until as late as 1838.262

254 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 44, at 3248, 3257
(declaring that no person would “be obliged to pay towards the maintenance and support of a
religious worship that he does not freely join in”). The constitution retained a provision stating that
Christianity was the state’s oﬃcial religion and outlining articles of faith, but in 1790 the state also
did away with those endorsements. See CURRY, supra note 53, at 150 (describing South Carolina’s
“provisions for freedom of religion”).
255 Act of Dec. 21, 1811, 1811 S.C. Acts 27, 27-28. The bill provided that the funding for the
program was to be “paid out of the treasury” of the state. Id.
256 See COLYER MERIWETHER, HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA
WITH A SKETCH OF THE FREE SCHOOLS 114 (1889) (describing support for religious instruction in
the state’s free schools). Religious societies throughout the South also provided education to Black
slaves, although many states including South Carolina eventually outlawed it. But slaves continued to
educate one another, and some religious groups continued to assist them in spite of the prohibition.
See id. at 123 (describing religious resistance to the ban on educating slaves in South Carolina).
257 Act of Mar. 19, 1784, No. 1274, 4 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 674-75
(Thomas Cooper ed., 1838) (establishing the colleges mentioned). See 1 GEORGE HOWE, HISTORY
OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN SOUTH CAROLINA 449 (1870) (describing Mt. Zion
Academy’s Presbyterian aﬃliation). The College of Charleston was not oﬃcially Episcopal but had
three Episcopal priests as presidents and conducted morning and evening prayers. AN EPISCOPAL
DICTIONARY OF THE CHURCH 85 (Don S. Armentrout & Robert Boak Scolum eds., 2000).
258 CURRY, supra note 53, at 152-53 (discussing the deterioration of the Anglican establishment
in Georgia).
259 ELBERT W.G. BOOGHER, SECONDARY EDUCATION IN GEORGIA 1732–1858, at102 (1933).
260 CURRY, supra note 53, at 153.
261 GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 44, at 791, 801.
262 GABEL, supra note 98, at 242.
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In Georgia as in other states, we cannot know for sure why opponents of
church taxes did not also object to funding for religious schools. But here
again, the information we do possess suggests that arguments about coerced
observance may have played a role. In 1785, Georgia’s Baptist coalition wrote
a memorial opposing the general assessment. They argued—just as Backus
had done in Massachusetts—that “civil and religious government ought not
to be blended together,” since “statesmen derive no authority from God or
men . . . [to] establish systems of religious opinion or modes of religious
worship.”263 Moreover, they continued by insisting—just as Madison would
do in Virginia—that the signiﬁcance of the worship demanded by the
assessment made no diﬀerence: “[t]he Three Penny Act on tea was a triﬂe in
itself, but a badge of slavery, and a precedent [for] more destructive
measures.”264 It is possible if not likely that proponents of religious liberty in
Georgia came to the same conclusion that their allies in Virginia, Maryland,
and other states already reached. While funding solely to support religious
worship was prohibited, the same was not true of funding for other goods,
even if religion beneﬁtted indirectly.
B. The Middle States
Unlike their counterparts in the south, the middle states—New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania—were never under state-wide Anglican
control.265 Nonetheless, here too the practices and arguments relating to
church taxes display a similar pattern. While funding oﬀered exclusively to
support religious worship was banned, the same could not be said of funding
for other goods—especially education—despite the fact that recipients also
used those funds for religion.
The evidence from New York is the most interesting. Prior to the
revolution, New York had at least a partial Anglican establishment in four
counties in metropolitan New York, but no oﬃcial establishment anywhere
else.266 In 1777, however, New York’s constitution ended church taxes in those
counties.267 And although churches continued to receive land grants in some
263 HISTORY OF THE BAPTIST DENOMINATION IN GEORGIA 262-63 (1881). For an in-depth
description of the role of Baptists in Georgia, see Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth
Colony, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1693, 1745-47 (2005).
264 HISTORY OF THE BAPTIST DENOMINATION IN GEORGIA, supra note 263, at 262 (brackets
in original).
265 CURRY, supra note 53, at 159-61 (describing the relationship between religion and
government in these four states).
266 McConnell, supra note 41, at 2129-30 (noting that four counties were required to support
an Anglican minister, but that there was “no oﬃcial establishment” anywhere else in New York).
267 CURRY, supra note 53, at 161 (noting a provision that declared void any laws “construed to
establish or maintain any particular denomination of Christians or their ministers”).
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new townships,268 the constitutional amendment ended taxation designed
exclusively to ﬁnance religious worship. But like other states, New York
continued to provide tax support for religious organizations that performed
public functions.
In 1795, the legislature set up a program providing £20,000 annually to
support schools.269 That fund was eventually supplemented by a direct property
tax—the first in the state’s history.270 And two years later, the legislature passed
an act for dispersing those funds in New York City. The list of beneficiaries is
striking. The law provided that the mayor was to pay an equal share of tax
dollars “for the education of poor children” to the following entities:
[T]he vestry of the Episcopal church, the vestry of Christ[’]s church, the
trustees of the ﬁrst Presbyterian church, the minister, elders, and deacons of
the Reformed Dutch church, the trustees of the Methodist Episcopal church,
the trustees of the Scotch Presbyterian church; . . . the trustees of the African
School, . . . the trustees of the united German Lutheran, the trustees of the
German Reformed churches . . . the trustees of the ﬁrst Baptist church [and]
. . . the trustees of the United Brethren or Moravian church . . . .271

In subsequent years the state also expanded the recipients of government
funds to include other religious institutions. In 1806, the legislature repealed
the state’s test oath excluding Catholics from oﬃce,272 and that same year
extended a share of the school funds to the Free School of St. Peter’s Church,
a Catholic charity school.273 Likewise, just a few years later, the legislature
provided identical tax support to a school for poor children run by the
Shearith Israel Congregation, the oldest Jewish synagogue in America.274 The
funds provided by the state even made up for the back payments these groups
should have received but for their earlier exclusion.275
268 See Act of May 5, 1786, ch. 67, 1786 N.Y. Laws 334, 337 (allocating land for “promoting the
gospel and a public school or schools” in new townships); GABEL, supra note 98, at 208.
269 See Act of Apr. 9, 1795, ch. 75, 1795 N.Y. Laws 626, 626. Unlike some education funds in
the South, New York explicitly stated the funds would be used to pay for education not only for
indigent white children but also for children “descended from Africans or Indians.” Id. at 628.
270 Act of Apr. 3, 1799, ch. 93, 1799 N.Y. Laws 446; see also GABEL, supra note 98, at 211 & n.20
(noting the tax to support schools was the ﬁrst direct tax in the state’s history).
271 Act of Apr. 8, 1801, ch. 189, 1801 N.Y. Laws 552, 552.
272 For an account of the movement to repeal the test oath, see JOHN WEBB PRATT,
RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH STATE THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY
121-25 (1967).
273 Act of Mar. 21, 1806, ch. LXIII, 1806 N.Y. Laws 393; see also JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 61-62 (1824) (documenting funding for the school well into the
nineteenth century).
274 Act of Apr. 9, 1811, ch. CCXLVI, § XLIII, 1811 N.Y. Laws 328, 333-34 (enacting the payment
of a sum to Shearith Israel).
275 See Jacob I. Hartstein, The Polonies Talmud Torah of New York, 34 PUBL’NS AM. JEWISH
SOC’Y 123, 133 (1937) (noting the additional funds).
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Support for Catholic and Jewish schools in New York brings up an
important point that has yet to be discussed. In the eighteenth and early
nineteenth century, the population of the United States was composed almost
entirely of Protestant Christians.276 As a result, funding for schools was often
directed only to those groups, because in many places, they were the only
ones with schools to fund. But as the evidence from New York illustrates,
when religious minorities created organizations large enough to provide
public beneﬁts, they were often included in funding programs.277 There is
little surviving evidence about how these groups thought about funding for
religion. But the evidence we do possess indicates that religious minorities
like Catholics and Jews were not opposed to funding schemes that paid for
religious instruction or religious activity more generally. They were opposed
to funding schemes that disqualiﬁed denominational education in favor of
more generic education, which was invariably Protestant and as such
exclusionary. And when they raised these concerns, they insisted—much like
opponents of church taxes had done—that government was forbidden from
legislating solely to ﬁnance a preferred mode of religious worship.
In 1812, the New York legislature considered a proposal that would have
ended funding for all denominational schools in New York City and turned
the funds over to the New York Free School Society.278 The Society, which
ran New York’s Lancasterian schools,279 aimed to “inculcate the sublime truths
of religion and morality contained in the Holy Scriptures” but “without

276 See Gerald V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 686 (1987) (noting the small numbers of Jews and Catholics and even
fewer atheists in Founding-era America).
277 In Maryland, for instance, Catholics made up a signiﬁcant portion of the population, and
their schools received funding alongside others. See supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text
(documenting ﬁnancial support for Catholic education in Maryland). The same was true in the city
of Georgetown in the District of Columbia. See infra notes 315–323. By the mid-nineteenth century,
funding for religious schools had become controversial, in large part because of anti-Catholic
hostility. But religious minorities continued to receive state support for other public services. In
1860, New York passed laws providing funds to the Hebrew Orphan Asylum to build an orphanage.
Ultimately, the government paid for two-thirds of the orphanage’s building costs as well as the land.
See JACQUELINE BERNARD, THE CHILDREN YOU GAVE US: A HISTORY OF 150 YEARS OF
SERVICE TO CHILDREN 8-12 (1973) (describing the history of Jewish asylum for orphans). Similarly,
in the mid- to late- nineteenth century, Catholic orphanages received public subsidies in no fewer
than eight states. See Marian J. Morton, The Transformation of Catholic Orphanages: Cleveland, 18511996, 88 CATH. HIST. REV. 65, 67 (2002) (noting public subsidies in New York, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, California, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa).
278 See PRATT, supra note 272, at 164-66 (describing how the Free School Society came to power).
279 Lancasterian schools were founded by an English Quaker named Joseph Lancaster, and
were known for their “monitorial” system, in which more advanced students monitored lessadvanced ones under the supervision of a principal. See CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE
REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 41 (1983).
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observing the peculiar forms of any religious Society . . . .”280 The trustees of
Shearith Israel authored a memorial opposing the plan, alongside the city’s
Roman Catholics and several others.281 According to Shearith Israel, the
proposal was objectionable because it aimed to “turn to a particular channel,
a bounty intended for the beneﬁt of [] poor children,” presumably a
euphemism for the law’s eﬀort to fund only generic Protestant instruction.282
But even more strikingly, the Congregation contended that the proposal
violated the “liberal spirit of our constitution, which recognizes no distinction
in religious worship.”283 For the trustees of Shearith Israel, funding for
education that included religion was perfectly permissible. What was
impermissible—and indeed unconstitutional—was directing funds to some
schools but not others based solely on a recipient’s religious activity.
Shearith Israel’s memorial highlights an important point. Proponents of
religious liberty in the Founding period resisted church taxes, in all likelihood
because such taxes were instituted solely to ﬁnance worship and thus seemed
indistinguishable from a coerced tithe. But refusing to fund schools based on
their religious activity was a diﬀerent issue entirely. Unlike church taxes,
school funds were provided for the purpose of educating poor children, so
there was nothing problematic about conveying such funds to religious actors.
On the contrary, it was denying funds for schools based solely on a recipient’s
religious activity that was forbidden—it violated the “liberal spirit of our
constitution” by disadvantaging some citizens relative to others based on a
“distinction in religious worship.” And as of 1813, the legislature in New York
agreed. A few months after receiving Shearith Israel’s memorial, it passed a
law directing city oﬃcials to collect a tax and distribute the funds to schools
run by “incorporated religious societies” as well as by the Free School Society,
“in proportion to the average number of children between the ages of four
and ﬁfteen years” attending each school.284
280 A. EMERSON PALMER, THE NEW YORK PUBLIC SCHOOL: BEING A HISTORY OF FREE
EDUCATION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 22 (1908) (quoting a publication from the Free School Society).
281 See The Memorial of the Trustees of the Congregation of Sheerith Israel Convened,
Petition to Legislature from K. K. S. I. on Religion and the Free School (June 10, 1813), reprinted in
Israel Joel, Abraham Isaacs, and Jonas N. Phillips, Items Relating to Congregation Shearith Israel, New
York, 27 PUBLN’S AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y 1, 92 (1920).
282 Id. at 95.
283 Id.
284 Act of Mar. 12, 1813, ch. LII, § IV, 1813 N.Y. Laws 53, 54–55. Officials ended funding for
denominational schools in New York in 1825. See GABEL, supra note 98, at 352-53. As several
commentators have explained, that change was the direct result of efforts on the part of the Free School
Society to stamp out competition, especially from Baptist and Catholic churches in the city. See Timothy
L. Smith, Protestant Schooling and American Nationality: 1800-1850, 53 J. AM. HIST. 679, 685-87 (1967)
(explaining that the Free School Society lobbied the legislature to de-fund church schools after a Baptist
church “asked and received from the legislature . . . the privilege of using any surplus state funds beyond
those required for [teachers’] salaries to equip or erect buildings,” a privilege that “had previously been
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Funding for religious schools was also common practice in the other
middle states. With the exception of New York, these colonies were all either
founded by Quakers or closely connected to the Quaker movement. As a
result, none of them ever collected church taxes, though Quaker influence later
in the period varied between states. Yet here too, evidence from these states
suggests that these citizens did not oppose funding for religious schools.
We can deal with Delaware and New Jersey fairly quickly. Neither ever
collected church taxes, though both explicitly banned them in their postrevolutionary constitutions.285 Yet as in other places, citizens in both states
seemed perfectly comfortable funding religious schools. In 1796, New Jersey
made a three-year grant to Princeton University—then known as the
Presbyterian College of New Jersey—to repair damages suﬀered during the
war.286 Moreover, when the state ﬁnally began funding basic education
through taxation in the 1840s, it explicitly included religious schools in the
allotment, declaring they ought to be supported in “just and ratable
proportion” to the number of children in their care.287
Delaware’s ﬁrst expenditure for education occurred in 1817. A few years
later, the state supplemented that program with another that provided money
to Sabbath day schools—that is, church schools oﬀering basic education to
poor children on Sundays.288 The act provided that the Sabbath schools were
to receive a per-student sum not to exceed twenty cents per child, which was
to be “raised as other county rates and levies are by the laws of this State.”289
Again, apparently no one thought such a law violated the state’s ban on
forcing citizens to “contribute to the . . . support of any place of worship, or
. . . ministry.”290

reserved for the Free School Society alone”); PRATT, supra note 272, at 166-67 (noting the Society’s
“economic motive” since appropriations were tied to student enrollment).
285 Delaware’s 1701 charter prohibited forcing citizens to “frequent or maintain any religious
Worship, Place or Ministry.” CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES FOR THE PROVINCE OF PA. (1701), reprinted in
1 THORPE, supra note 44, at 557, 558. In 1792, Delaware enacted a constitutional provision prohibiting
citizens from being “compelled to . . . contribute to the erection or support of any place of worship, or to
the maintenance of any ministry, against his own free will and consent.” DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 1,
reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 44, at 568, 568. Likewise, New Jersey’s 1776 constitution protected
citizens from being “obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building or
repairing any other church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister
or ministry.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 18, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 44, at 2594, 2497.
286 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 215-16 (detailing the grant to Princeton).
287 Act of Apr. 17, 1846, § 12, 1846 N.J. Laws 164, 167-68; see also GABEL, supra note 98, at 37374 (discussing education policy in New Jersey).
288 Act of Feb. 3, 1821, ch. LXV, 6 Del. Laws 85 (1821).
289 Id.
290 DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 44, at 568.
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The same was true in Pennsylvania, the original Quaker colony. Like other
Quaker colonies, the state had never collected church taxes.291 Moreover,
Quaker inﬂuence there remained notable after the revolution.292 Yet here too,
funding for religious schools ﬂourished.
In 1802, Pennsylvania began what was probably the country’s ﬁrst school
voucher program, which continued for roughly a decade. Prior to the
program, education in the state was provided through two primary means:
“church schools” run by speciﬁc denominations, and independent
“subscription schools.”293 The 1802 law included both, stating that poor
families could send their children to “any school in their neighborhood” and
government would reimburse the school at taxpayer expense.294
The state also provided a seemingly unending list of one-oﬀ subsidies to
religious schools of all kinds. In 1798, Newton Academy—a Presbyterian-run
school—received $4,000 for a building in exchange for a promise to educate
poor children.295 The year before, another Presbyterian school called
Washington Academy got $3,000 under the same arrangement.296 The
Academy of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia—where famed
dictionary author Noah Webster once taught as a schoolmaster—received
10,000 acres of land as an endowment for its free school, as did several other
Lutheran schools in the area.297 And the same was true of the state’s religious
universities, which received land or money grants ranging from $2,000 to
$9,000 between the years 1786 and 1815.298
See CURRY, supra note 53, at 72-73.
See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1810 & n.82 (2005) (noting
that Quakers were a “substantial minority” in Pennsylvania in the years immediately surrounding
the Revolution and likely represented roughly one quarter of the state’s voters).
293 JAMES P. WICKERSHAM, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 178 (1886).
294 See Act of Mar. 1, 1802, ch. MMCCXLVII, § 1, 17 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
81, 81 (1915); see also WICKERSHAM, supra note 293, at 264-66 (describing these laws and variations
thereof which existed from 1802 through 1809). The 1802 law said funding for the program would
be “collect[ed] in the same way and manner . . . as poor taxes or road taxes are levied and
collected . . . .” Id. at 264.
295 Act of Mar. 16, 1798, ch. MCMLXXXIV, § 1, 16 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA
62, 63 (1911); see also WILLIAM W.H. DAVIS, HISTORY OF BUCKS COUNTY 216 & n.12 (noting the
academy “with the Presbyterian pastor at its head, was the right arm of the church” in the county).
296 Act of Mar. 20, 1797, ch. MCMXXX, § 1, 15 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 501,
502 (1911); see also CHARLES LEWIS MAURER, EARLY LUTHERAN EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
63 (1932) (noting a $2,000 grant for a Lutheran school called Reading Academy to construct a
“commodious and elegant building”).
297 Act of Mar. 29, 1787, ch. MCCXCVIII, 12 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 333
(1906); see also WICKERSHAM, supra note 293, at 98 (noting the connection to Webster); Act of Sept.
23, 1789, ch. MCDXXXIX, 13 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 333 (1908); Act of Feb. 14,
1789, ch. MCCCXC, 13 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 182 (1908) (providing land
endowments to Lutheran free schools).
298 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 218-19 (documenting these subsidies).
291
292
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At this point, a brief summation of the evidence is in order. From 1776 to
the decade after the ratiﬁcation of the Establishment Clause, citizens of every
state outside of New England either banned church taxes in their
constitutions or rejected proposals to enact them. Yet in every single one of
these states, citizens went on to provide funding for religious schools. One
could try to come up with an explanation for that practice consistent with a
broad rule against subsidizing religious activity. But the most obvious ones
are in signiﬁcant tension with the evidence. Funding for religious schools was
not a mistake, or explainable by a lack of resolve—it was done even in states
like Virginia and Pennsylvania where resistance to church taxes was especially
strong. Nor is it explainable in terms of the type of aid oﬀered. In
Pennsylvania, New York, and most other states, the funds were provided by
coercive taxation of one sort or another.
But another explanation is possible. Judged by their practice, citizens in
these states believed that providing taxpayer funds with the sole aim of
supporting an institution’s religious function was prohibited. But the same
was not true of programs providing funds for things like education, even if
recipients might also use those funds for religion. On the contrary, at least
some argued that as to those programs, it was withholding funds solely because
of a recipient’s religious practice that was prohibited. We cannot know how
widely these conclusions were linked to the argument about coerced religious
observance. But the practice is consistent with that view, and with the more
truncated versions of the argument that appear in places like Maryland,
Georgia, and New York. Although majorities in diﬀerent states almost surely
had diﬀerent reasons for their decisions, the argument about coerced
observance oﬀers an explanation as to why even vocal opponents of church
taxes throughout the country did not object to government funding for
religious schools. And indeed, the same practice was continued by the federal
government even after the ratiﬁcation of the Establishment Clause.
C. The Federal Government
The Establishment Clause was ratiﬁed on December 15, 1791. By its terms,
the Clause prohibited Congress from enacting laws “respecting an
establishment of religion.”299 Yet for decades after its enactment, the federal
government—like the recently disestablished states—provided government
funds for religious schools. That practice suggests that, just as citizens in the
states had behaved with reference to their own constitutions, no one thought
the federal Constitution prohibited funding for religious schools either.

299

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The ﬁrst piece of evidence on this score involves funding for education in
the District of Columbia. In 1804, Congress ordained a municipal
government for the city of Washington, D.C. and provided it with authority
to engage in “the establishment and superintendence of schools.”300 The city
promptly used that delegated power to pass an ordinance declaring that the
schools would be funded by taxes on various property, and by licensing fees
for things like carriages, taverns, and billiard tables.301 Initially, oﬃcials
directed those funds to two government-established academies for poor
children: one on the eastern side of the city and one on the western side.302
But eventually, the city used its federal authority to support a Lancasterian
school. Those schools—which were the same ones the Free School Society
ran in New York—typically included non-denominational Bible reading and
other religious elements as part of the curriculum.303 And though we have
limited information about the Washington, D.C. school, there is good reason
to believe it ran the same way. Just a few years after the founding of the
school, the principal wrote a letter to local oﬃcials reporting that more than
half of the school’s ninety-one children had “learned to read in the Old and
New Testaments,” and roughly one quarter “are now learning to read Dr.
Watts’s Hymns.”304
Beginning in 1812, the city of Washington provided funds to support the
Lancasterian school out of its education tax.305 That particular funding
scheme, which paid for the principal’s salary and the costs of educating poor
children, continued for at least six years.306 After that, other funds seem to
have been provided.307 And that was not all. During this same period,
300 J. Ormond Wilson, Eighty Years of the Public Schools of Washington: 1805 to 1885, RECS.
COLUMBIA HIST. SOC’Y, WASH., D.C., 1897, at 119, 121.
301 Id. at 122.
302 See SAMUEL YORKE ATLEE, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF WASHINGTON
CITY, D.C. 4 (1876).
303 See infra notes 279–280 (describing the features of New York’s Lancasterian schools). The
routine at the New York schools included daily Bible reading, assembling children each Sunday to
attend worship at their chosen denomination, and even inviting members of local congregations to
provide voluntary religious education once a week. See JOHN FRANKLIN REIGART, THE
LANCASTERIAN SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS OF NEW YORK CITY 65-66 (1916).
304 ATLEE, supra note 302, at 11-12.
305 Id. at 9 (documenting that city oﬃcials had acquired a building for the Lancasterian school
and hired a principal for a two-year contract at $500 per year).
306 See id. at 16 (documenting the end of the tax program and the annual $1,500 appropriation
for schools in 1818). Prior to this date, the District sometimes struggled to pay the school’s principal,
but by 1817 it had increased his salary to $800 per year. Id. at 10-15; see also John Clagett Proctor,
Joseph Lancaster and the Lancasterian Schools in the District of Columbia, with Incidental School Notes,
RECS. COLUMBIA HIST. SOC’Y, WASH., D.C., 1923, at 1, 10-11.
307 The Committee’s journal ends with the repeal of the $1,500 appropriation. However, the
Lancaster school appears to have been in continuous operation until 1844, when the city enacted a law
reorganizing all schools within the city. See ATLEE, supra note 302, at 16; Proctor, supra note 306, at 13.
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Congress and then-President James Madison gave permission to institute a
lottery to raise funds for two other proposed Lancasterian schools.308 In 1821
President James Monroe even authorized the original Lancasterian school to
take up residence in a building owned by the federal government that had
been used as a horse stable.309 The event was celebrated with a great public
parade and speeches by prominent oﬃcials.310 Likewise, in 1840, the city
brieﬂy funded two “Female Charity Schools” run by the Presbyterian
Church.311 The program was later discontinued out of a concern it might lead
to “contention and strife,” most likely a euphemism for the fear that Catholic
schools may also ask for money.312 Yet during all of this, there appears to be
no record of anyone raising an Establishment Clause objection.
A similar set of events took place in Georgetown. Although the town had
been originally chartered by the Maryland legislature, it was also part of the
District of Columbia and thus under federal authority.313 Yet here too,
funding for religious schools proceeded as a matter of course. Beginning in
1815, the city appropriated $1,000 annually for the support of its own
Lancasterian school.314 But even more interesting is what followed.
In 1818, Trinity Church—the community’s oldest Catholic
congregation—began a free school for indigent boys.315 Within a month of
opening, it was educating more than one hundred poor children.316 But
supporting the school ﬁnancially was diﬃcult, and eventually the church
petitioned the city of Georgetown for assistance. Several council members
argued that exclusive support for the Lancasterian school was more than
suﬃcient to provide for the city’s poor.317 But others contended that the

308 See 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 635 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S.
Franklin eds., 1834); see also id. at 634 (noting Madison’s approval of the two schools).
309 See Proctor, supra note 306, at 11-12.
310 Id. at 12.
311 ATLEE, supra note 302, at 22. One of the Presbyterian schools served eighty indigent
children, and another served as many as ﬁfty. Id.
312 Id. at 24. By this period, anti-Catholic nativism was in full swing in many parts of the
country. See TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY 11-12 (1992) (describing a famous threeday riot in 1844 in which two Catholic churches in Philadelphia were destroyed after local Catholics
requested that Catholic Bibles be read alongside Protestant ones in the city’s locally-funded schools).
313 See ADVISORY COMM. ON FISCAL RELS. STUDY, 74TH CONG., REPORT ON FISCAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 22-23 (1937)
(describing Congress’s control over Georgetown as a part of the District of Columbia). In 1805,
Congress explicitly exercised its authority over the city by amending its charter. See Act of Mar. 3,
1805, ch. 32, 2 Stat. 332-36.
314 WILLIAM W. WARNER, AT PEACE WITH ALL THEIR NEIGHBORS: CATHOLICS AND
CATHOLICISM IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL, 1787-1860, at 76 (1994).
315 Id. at 118.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 77.
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request raised a more fundamental issue. According to one member, a
Protestant named Henry Addison:
If any portion of our citizens are excluded from a just participation of any
investment of the public funds in consequence of a peculiarity of religious faith,
a case presents itself which demands the exercise of a tolerating spirit. Such is
now the case before us. The real question is, whether a religious sect which has
been taxed more than seventeen years to support a free school of whose
advantages they could not avail themselves, can now be allowed a small sum of
money to assist in defraying the expenses of their one free school, established
and supported by more than ten years by their own individual contributions.318

Addison’s argument bears a strong similarity to the argument oﬀered by
Shearith Israel during the controversy over school funding in New York.
Shearith Israel had contended that a proposal to deny funding to
denominational schools violated “the liberal spirit of our constitution,”
because it proposed allocating funds to some schools but not others based on
a “distinction in religious worship.”319 Addison reasoned similarly, contending
that government ought not “exclude[] [citizens] from . . . any investment of
the public funds in consequence of a peculiarity of religious faith.”320
Again, this argument highlights the important difference that citizens in
this period perceived between church taxes and funding for religious schools.
Providing funds exclusively to support a religious function was objectionable,
probably because such schemes were viewed as coerced tithes. But that
objection did not apply to providing religious entities with funds to support
goods like education. On the contrary, for people like Addison and others,
refusing to provide school funds based solely on “a peculiarity of religious
faith” was actually a penalty on religious exercise—it excluded citizens from
“just participation” in “investment of the public funds” solely for practicing
their religion.321 And as that argument had succeeded in New York, so it also
succeeded in Georgetown.
In 1832, the city awarded Trinity’s free school $200 annually—a sum which
probably corresponded to the proportion of children educated there
compared to the Lancasterian school.322 Again, there seems to be no evidence
Id.
The Memorial of the Trustees of the Congregation of Shearith Israel Convened, supra note
281, at 95.
320 WARNER, supra note 314, at 77.
321 Id.
322 Id. As of 1815, the Lancasterian school in Georgetown was educating roughly ﬁve hundred
students, while Trinity’s free school had roughly one hundred. See ATLEE, supra note 302, at 13
(documenting the number of children enrolled in the Lancasterian school); WARNER, supra note
314, at 118 (documenting the number of children enrolled in the Trinity free school). For the text of
318
319
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of any Establishment Clause objection. On the contrary, the year after
receiving the allotment, the trustees of the Trinity school successfully
petitioned Congress to incorporate it, quite possibly so that the school could
more easily receive the outside funds.323
An additional piece of evidence involving the federal government provides
further reason to believe that arguments like Addison’s and Shearith Israel’s
may have been fairly well-accepted. Beginning in 1727, Catholic nuns in New
Orleans operated a convent which included a large free school for destitute
children.324 When the Louisiana Purchase occurred, the nuns sent a letter to
Jefferson in 1804 inquiring about the future of their property. Because the
property had previously been controlled by the French government, it could
very well have been considered to have passed to the United States.325
Jefferson sent a response to assuage their concerns. He first assured the
nuns that “the principles of the constitution” ensured that the property would
be “preserved to you sacred and inviolate,” and that the convent “will be
permitted to govern itself . . . without interference from the civil authority.”326
He then said that “whatever diversity of shade may appear in the religious
opinions of our fellow citizens,” the “charitable objects of your institution . . .
cannot fail to ensure it the patronage of the government it is under.”327
Like Addison and Shearith Israel, Jeﬀerson acknowledged that
denominational schools were presumptively entitled to public support for the
“charitable objects” they undertook.328 Moreover, responding to the nuns’
worries that their particular religious activity might disqualify them, Jeﬀerson
explicitly invoked the federal Constitution to assert the opposite conclusion.
The Catholic school was guaranteed “the patronage of the government” for
its educational activities, “whatever diversity of shade may appear in the
religious opinions of our fellow citizens.”329 Far from providing a reason for
special exclusion, Jeﬀerson insisted that denying the school support because
of its religious activity was not just impolitic, but perhaps even prohibited by

the resolution authorizing the funds, see FIRST REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1874–’75, at 53 (1876).
323 See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 88, 22 Stat. 538 (incorporating the Georgetown Free School and
Orphan Asylum in the District of Columbia).
324 43 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 298-99 (James P. McClure, Elaine Weber Pascu,
Tom Downey, Martha J. King, W. Bland Whitley, Andrew J.B. Fagal, & Merry Ellen Scofield eds., 2018).
325 Letter from the Ursuline Nuns of New Orleans to Thomas Jeﬀerson (Apr. 23, 1804),
reprinted in 43 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 324, at 297, 297.
326 Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to the Ursuline Nuns of New Orleans (July 13, 1804),
reprinted in 44 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 78, 78-79 (James P. McClure, Martha J. King,
Tom Downey, W. Bland Whitley, Andrew J.B. Fagal, & Merry Ellen Scoﬁeld eds., 2019).
327 Id. at 79.
328 Id.
329 Id.
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the “principles of the constitution.”330 Just as government could not provide
support solely to ﬁnance a recipient’s religion, neither could it deny support
where the sole reason for doing so was a recipient’s religion.
Support for religious education on the part of the federal government was
not limited to these instances. An equally important class of evidence involves
federal funding for religious education among the Native American tribes.
Less than a year after the Establishment Clause was ratiﬁed, the
Washington administration authorized payment of $1,500 annually to support
a Presbyterian school among the Iroquois and Stockbridge Indians.331 A
similar practice continued during Thomas Jeﬀerson’s presidency. In 1803, the
federal government provided the Kaskaskia tribe with a payment of $100 to
be repeated annually for seven years “towards the support of a priest,” who
was to “instruct as many of their children as possible in the rudiments of
literature” while also carrying out “the duties of his oﬃce.”332 It also provided
a one-time payment of $300 toward the erection of a church, perhaps to
facilitate the instruction.333 Had the Establishment Clause been understood
as forbidding any subsidization of religious activity, it is diﬃcult to see how
any of this could have proceeded without objection, from Jeﬀerson himself
no less. Yet that appears to be what happened.
Programs providing federal money to run religious schools for Native
Americans continued long past Jeﬀerson’s presidency. Beginning in 1793 and
continuing thereafter, Congress designated as much as $20,000 to fund
“temporary agents, to reside among the Indians, as he [the President] shall
think proper,” many of whom were Christian ministers.334 By 1817, Congress
was appropriating $10,000 per year to support the work of religious
organizations in providing basic education.335 Congress continued that
practice more or less uninterrupted until as late as 1870, when it appropriated
$100,000 for such purposes.336 Recipients of those funds were private agencies
Id. at 78.
See Joseph D. Ibbotson, Samuel Kirkland, the Treaty of 1792, and the Indian Barrier State, 19
N.Y. HIST. 374, 391 (1938).
332 See A Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indians,
Kaskaskia Tribe-U.S., art. III, Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, 78-79 (1803); see also Robert L. Cord, Mr.
Jeﬀerson’s “Nonabsolute” Wall of Separation Between Church and State, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL
CULTURE IN JEFFERSON’S VIRGINIA 167, 174-75 (Garrett Ward Sheldon & Daniel L. Dreisbach
eds., 2000) (describing the treaty).
333 See A Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indians,
supra note 332, at 79.
334 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 9, 1 Stat. 329, 331; see also Michael D. Breidenbach,
Religious Tests, Loyalty Oaths, and the Ecclesiastical Context of the First Amendment, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 166, 189 (Michael D.
Briedenbach & Owen Anderson eds., 2020) (describing the funds).
335 See CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMERICAN MODEL OF STATE AND SCHOOL 167 (2012).
336 Id.
330
331
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supervised by Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Quakers,
Catholics, and other denominations, all of whom ran religious schools.337
In sum, both the federal government and officials under its authority
continued to provide money to religious institutions for education even after
the ratification of the Establishment Clause, just as the states had done after
prohibiting church taxes in their constitutions. Again, perhaps there is an
explanation for this practice consistent with a broad no-aid theory. But the
most plausible explanation seems to be that, like their counterparts in the
states, federal actors did not think such expenditures were prohibited merely
because the funds might be used for religion. In fact, on several occasions, they
asserted that it was the withholding of funds because of a recipient’s religion
that was forbidden, at least when the funds were provided for a public purpose.
Still, there is one other issue that merits attention. Traditional church
taxes had certain features in common that made them objectionable to many
people at the Founding. But there were also some areas of ongoing
disagreement. For instance, what if the tax wasn’t explicitly earmarked for
religious recipients, or the funding didn’t involve coercion of any kind?
Understanding how members of the Founding generation actually identiﬁed
church tax schemes is essential for relating the Founding-era history to ours,
and to understanding how the argument comparing church taxes to coerced
tithes functioned in practice.
III. IDENTIFYING CHURCH TAXES
Almost all church tax schemes at the Founding had three elements in
common: (1) they collected private resources through coercion, (2) earmarked
those resources for religious actors, and (3) redistributed them for the
purpose of ﬁnancing religious functions. In Massachusetts, for instance,
church taxes were assessed on all eligible citizens and designated at collection
for the beneﬁt of the local minister to support him in carrying out religious
duties. Likewise, in Virginia and other Anglican colonies, church taxes had
long been assessed on a per-capita basis for the explicit beneﬁt of the Anglican
minister in his parish role. Later iterations like general assessment proposals
or exemptions for dissenters complicated things slightly. But these elements
were still the deﬁning features of most church tax schemes during the
Founding period.
The argument that church taxes were a coerced religious observance—a tithe
or sacrifice—fits most comfortably in relation to these schemes. To paraphrase
337 See id. This material is just a sketch. For a more comprehensive description of these
missionary partnerships, see Nathan Chapman, The Forgotten Federal-Missionary Partnerships: New
Light on the Establishment Clause, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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Founding-era advocates of religious liberty, earmarked taxes to support a
church’s religious function both “force[d] people to part with their money for
religious purposes” at collection,338 and subsequently financed ministers “in the
Pursuit of religious duties.”339 But proponents of religious liberty also extended
these objections to other kinds of funding schemes that were specifically
designed to finance religious worship. Some of these arguments appear to have
garnered less support than objections to traditional church taxes. But
understanding them provides important information about how at least some at
the Founding viewed other attempts to finance religion—a point of possible
importance for considering controversies over funding today.
A. The Role of Earmarks
The ﬁrst important consideration concerns earmarks. As has already been
mentioned, one common feature of Founding-era church tax schemes was
that they involved taxes earmarked for religious entities at collection, rather
than generic taxes paid into the general treasury. For example, Patrick
Henry’s general assessment proposal in Virginia explicitly announced that the
tax was “for the support of Christian teachers” and could only be distributed
to churches for uses furthering that purpose.340 Earmarks undoubtedly
strengthened the argument that church taxes were a coerced sacriﬁce, since
they accentuated the “causal link between the extraction . . . and the monetary
support of religion.”341 But the fact that taxes were sometimes earmarked for
religious recipients was not in itself suﬃcient to trigger this objection. And
there is at least some evidence suggesting that, where the eventual
expenditure was aimed exclusively at ﬁnancing religion, an earmark may not
have been necessary either.
The ﬁrst point—that earmarks alone were not dispositive—relates to the
distinction between church taxes and funding for religious schools. In
supporting religious schools, many states employed tax money that was
designated as general revenue or assigned for education generally at the point
of collection. But sometimes they also created schemes that speciﬁcally
earmarked funds for religious schools. In Virginia, for instance, the legislature
repeatedly reserved a portion of surveyor fees in certain regions for speciﬁc
schools, including several religious ones.342 Similarly, support for Washington
College and for other religious schools in Maryland was explicitly tied to the

338
339
340
341
342

LELAND, supra note 170, at 188.
PHIPPS, supra note 190, at 6.
A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 188-89.
Esbeck, supra note 23, at 90.
See supra notes 90–100 and accompanying text.
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imposition of various taxes and fees in the eastern shore.343 The same was
true in Delaware and New Jersey, which both had laws explicitly stating that
a portion of speciﬁc taxes would be distributed to religious entities—
including churches—to subsidize their schools.344 As we have already
observed, none of these schemes provoked protest, even from the most
extreme supporters of religious liberty. The fact that a tax was earmarked for
a religious recipient was not suﬃcient to generate the objection that it was a
coerced oﬀering, at least where the obvious aim was promoting education.
Designating a tax for the beneﬁt of a religious entity—without more—did
not make it a tithe.
The second point is more complicated. For the Founding generation,
earmarking a tax to support a religious school was not suﬃcient to trigger
objections, presumably because such funding still served a public purpose
even if it beneﬁted religion indirectly. But what about instances in which
government attempted to use funds collected through general taxes for an
exclusively religious end? Here the evidence is less clear, but there is
indication that at least some at the Founding viewed such schemes as
comparable to coerced tithes, even though they lacked the earmarks normally
associated with church taxes.
The most well-known example is payments for chaplains. Several days
before the language of the Establishment Clause was agreed on, Congress
passed a bill authorizing salaries for various oﬃcials, including a chaplain for
each house of Congress.345 The funds used to pay these salaries were to be
drawn from the federal treasury,346 which at the time was funded primarily
through taxes on imports.347 Madison voted for the expenditure and later
approved appropriations for chaplains as President, but several years later he
objected, in part because the payments for chaplains were given for “religious
worship . . . performed by Ministers of religion . . . [that were] paid out of
the national taxes.”348 Baptist minister John Leland reasoned similarly, noting
that although the salary of federal chaplains was “a triﬂe, far less than the
three pence upon a pound of tea,” it was nonetheless objectionable since
“[t]his money they receive for religious services, by the force of the laws of

See supra notes 226–233 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 285–290 and accompanying text.
See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 Stat. 70, 71.
See id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 71 (noting that the payments were to be “paid out of the public treasury”).
THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
REVENUES: 1790 TO PRESENT 3 (2006) (noting that until 1863, the federal government’s “major
source of revenue was customs duties”).
348 James Madison, Detached Memoranda, reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 89, 91-92.
343
344
345
346
347

172

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 111

the national legislature.”349 According to Leland, such support was a “thing
to be reprobated,”350 and at least roughly comparable to “robbery for burnt
oﬀerings,”351 despite the fact that it was supplied through general tax revenue.
The argument against paying chaplains with tax revenue was consistent
with what Madison called “the pure principle of religious freedom” interpreted
“[i]n “strictness.”352 Chaplains threatened religious freedom because they
inevitably reflected the majority’s religious preferences to the exclusion of the
minority, and because they risked corrupting religion by making it a tool of the
state.353 But the idea that the government’s sole aim in paying chaplains was to
finance “religious services” was questionable in many instances. Chaplains in
the army and the navy were an accommodation to the religious needs of
soldiers—their purpose was to allow individuals in the government’s care to
practice their religion, a point which Madison himself more or less admitted.354
Moreover, although payments for congressional chaplains were more troubling,
even these writers recognized that their unique context made them a minor
deviation—a “little horn” as Leland put it—not a major encroachment.355 But
349 John Leland, An Elective Judiciary, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN
LELAND, supra note 170, at 283, 293.
350 Id.
351 See John Leland, Speech Delivered in the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, on
the Subject of Religious Freedom (1811), in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND,
supra note 170, at 353, 355 (observing that “God hates robbery for burnt oﬀerings” and continuing in
the next paragraph by observing that “we cannot pay legal taxes for religious services, descending
even to the grade of a chaplain for the legislature”).
352 Madison, supra note 348, at 91.
353 See id. at 92 (observing that the “tenets of the chaplains elected [by the majority] shut the
door of worship agst the members whose creeds & consciences forbid a participation in that of the
majority,” and that chaplaincy erects “a political authority in matters of religion” (bracketed material
in original)). Similar criticisms continue to be leveled against legislative chaplains today. See, e.g.,
Christopher Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV.
972, 978 (2010) (arguing that legislative chaplaincies require government to “decide the proper type
of religious message and the proper type of person to deliver it,” necessarily meaning that “someone
will have to be rejected”).
354 See Madison, supra note 348, at 92-93 (observing that “the motive” for providing chaplains
for the armed forces “is laudable” and that chaplains for “navies with insulated crews may be less
within the scope” of his objection). This same debate over military chaplains continues. Compare Ira
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the
Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 165 (2007) (defending the constitutionality of military chaplains
and the appropriate role they provide to “those service members whose religious experience depends
on a vibrant . . . corps of chaplains”), with Steven K. Green, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Military
Chaplains and the First Amendment, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 169 (2007) (contending that military
chaplains are not required under the Free Exercise Clause and are unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause).
355 See Leland, supra note 349, at 293; see also Madison, supra note 349, at 92 (observing in
reference to funding for chaplains that “it will be better to apply to it the legal aphorism de minimis
non curat lex: or to class it cum ‘maculis quas aut incuria fudit, aut humana parum cavit natura’”);
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 82, 82 (suggesting the same). The translations of those
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the same was not true of other programs that directed general tax revenue solely
to support religious functions. And here, the most significant evidence comes
from Connecticut.
In 1816, Connecticut passed a law entitled “An Act for the Support of
Literature and Religion.”356 The act began by recognizing that the state was
set to receive a large amount of money from the federal government, which
was a refund from taxes collected to support national defense during the War
of 1812.357 It then declared that the refunded money was to be divided among
various denominations: Congregationalist churches were to receive one-third,
Episcopalians one-seventh, Baptists one-eighth, Methodists one-twelfth,
with an additional one-seventh for Yale College.358 Each denomination was
to use the funds “for the support of the Gospel in their respective societies.”359
As a last-ditch eﬀort to support Connecticut’s religious establishment, the
1816 appropriation was a brilliant ploy. Because the money had been originally
extracted as a war tax rather than a tax earmarked for ministers, it was
arguably diﬀerent in kind from other church taxes. Or so it appeared to the
law’s supporters. According to the drafting committee, the law’s
appropriation could be rightly accepted “[e]ven [by] those Christians who do
not acknowledge the right of the Civil Magistrate to enforce collections for
these purposes.”360 But proponents of religious liberty did not see it that way.
“Surely they must have supposed us less virtuous than Judas Iscariot,” noted
one writer, and others agreed.361
Baptists and Methodists throughout the state published numerous
objections to the law, which they saw as an extension of Connecticut’s existing
church tax system.362 The resistance culminated in a memorial written by the
state’s Baptists.363 It began by proceeding through the usual arguments. Laws
requiring people to pay money solely to finance someone else’s ministers were
offensive and unjust, since they required others to do what supporters of church
phrases are, loosely: “the law does not bother with triﬂes,” and “I shall not cavil at a few faults,
proceeding either from negligence, or from the imperfection of our nature.”
356 An Act for the Support of Literature and Religion, ch. XIII, 1816 Conn. Pub. Acts 279.
357 Id. § 1.
358 Id. §§ 3-7.
359 See e.g., id. §§ 3; see also id. §§ 5-6. The residual funds were to remain in the treasury—a
reserve that, according to the drafting committee, was to be distributed to any denomination that
had been omitted “for want of correct information.” See COMMITTEE REPORT, reprinted in CONN.
COURANT (Hartford, Conn.), Nov. 5, 1816.
360 Id.
361 See 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 1039 (quoting Editorial, COLUMBIAN REG. (New
Haven, Conn.), Dec. 7, 1816)). Proponents of religious liberty widely accepted the idea that the law
was in fact a bribe. See id. at 1037-38.
362 See id. at 1034-42 (describing the resistance to the law).
363 See ASA WILCOX, A PLEA FOR THE BAPTIST PETITION (1818). For a truncated version of
the petition, see also “The Baptist Petition,” AM. MERCURY (Hartford, Conn.), Aug. 18, 1818, at 2.
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taxes would never want done to them.364 Moreover, since support for a minister
in his religious role was “required as a religious duty,” it was an “offering[]”365
that exceeded government’s rightful authority to compel—“the individual
himself is the only human judge of what his duty is towards his God.”366
Most important, however, was the memorial’s treatment of the 1816 law
itself. According to the Baptists, the appropriation was objectionable even
though it had been raised through a non-earmarked tax: it still took “[s]ome
money, that was raised by the civil authority by taxation,” and “because it
came in that way; and was to be used exclusively ‘for the support of the
gospel,’ it remain[ed] unaccepted.”367 The 1816 law did not involve a tax
labeled at collection for the support of ministers. But for these Baptists, that
made little diﬀerence—it was money garnered through coercion and
appropriated for an exclusively religious purpose. “It is more blessed to give
than to receive,” they observed, “but there is no blessedness in compulsion,
either to the suﬀerer or receiver.”368
Baptists in Connecticut objected to the 1816 appropriation as a form of
religious coercion even though it did not originate as an earmarked tax. That
conclusion resonates with objections to paying chaplains out of general tax
revenue. And it also has clear aﬃnities with the idea that taxing citizens solely
to ﬁnance religion is in fact equivalent to mandating a religious observance.
But none of the sources equate these schemes with coerced tithes
unequivocally, and it is unclear how widely that argument would have been
shared if they had—after all, no one would have recognized the payment as a
tithe at the point of collection. Yet if there is ambiguity in the precise nature
of the objection, there is no ambiguity in how far it extended. Having asserted
that the 1816 law was unacceptable because it involved tax money
appropriated “exclusively ‘for the support of the Gospel,’” the Baptists
clariﬁed their position as follows:
Had the legislature left it freely to the donees, to appropriate it, as they
thought best; and if a method of dividing it could be found, that would give
general satisfaction, perhaps it would have been accepted. It presents a
singular instance in national concerns [however] that power and property

WILCOX, supra note 363, at 5.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 16. Baptists and other dissenters also noted that the law entirely omitted smaller
denominations like Quakers and Separates, and that it may also have been defective in the
proportions it allotted to other denominations. See 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 1036-37
(describing arguments against the bill).
368 “The Baptist Petition,” supra note 363, at 2.
364
365
366
367
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should be bestowed on a people, for religious purposes, which they never
desired . . . .369

According to the Connecticut Baptists, the 1816 appropriation was
objectionable because it provided funds garnered through coercion
exclusively to support a religious function. But that did not mean that all
appropriations to churches or religious entities were forbidden. Had the
legislature instead simply provided funds for a public purpose and left
religious recipients “to appropriate it, as they thought best,” and had the
method for dividing it achieved “general satisfaction” by being truly evenhanded among denominations, it would have been acceptable.370 That
position coheres with the view held by Baptists elsewhere regarding tax
support for education, even education that included religion.371 And indeed,
when Connecticut ﬁnally forbade church taxes and ended its establishment a
few years later, Baptists in that state followed their counterparts elsewhere.
In 1820, they took the money that had been provided under the 1816 act, now
free of the prior restriction, and applied the funds to support their schools.372
Earmarks were a common feature of traditional church taxes. But the
evidence indicates that members of the Founding generation viewed that
point with some complexity. The decision to designate taxes at the point of
collection for use by a religious entity was not in itself enough to make the
tax a coerced tithe, at least where the appropriation was provided for a public
purpose like education. Likewise, although it is unclear whether taxes lacking
earmarks at collection could also be viewed as coerced tithes, some at the
Founding spoke about these schemes in similar terms where the funds were
appropriated solely to ﬁnance religious worship.
B. The Role of Individual Coercion
In addition to earmarked taxes, virtually all church tax schemes at the
Founding involved some form of individual coercion. In Massachusetts, for
instance, church taxes were assessed on all eligible citizens, and failure to pay

WILCOX, supra note 363, at 16.
Id. The proportions of funds provided to various denominations under the 1816 act were
not drawn from any objective criteria, leading many to argue that the law improperly excluded
smaller denominations, underpaid dissenters, and overpaid the established Congregational churches.
See 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 1036-37 (documenting these objections).
371 See, e.g., supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text (documenting the Baptist position in
Virginia); supra notes 234–239, 245 and accompanying text (noting Baptist support for government
funding of their schools in Maryland); supra notes 202–212 and accompanying text (documenting
Baptist requests for school funds elsewhere in New England).
372 See 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 1042 & n.36 (noting Baptist reception of the funds
in 1820 and their incorporation of the Connecticut Baptist Education Society to receive them).
369
370
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resulted in ﬁnes or imprisonment.373 The same was true in Anglican colonies
like Virginia.374 Here too, however, the evidence suggests that although
coercion played an important role in identifying church taxes, it was decisive
only when joined with other considerations.
The ﬁrst important observation is a simple one: the mere fact that funds
obtained through coercion were given to religious entities did not trigger an
objection—either about coerced tithing or anything else. As we have already
observed, virtually every state that had ended church taxes in the decade
before or after the ratiﬁcation of the Establishment Clause provided
government funds to religious schools. Some of these—like Virginia and
Maryland—supported those schools through mandatory fees on common
activities or through the sale of property acquired through taxation.375 Other
states like New York, North Carolina, or Pennsylvania funded religious
schools through direct property taxes or similar forms of taxation, which were
undoubtedly coercive.376 And some entities like the federal government used
a combination of these measures.377 Taken at face value, those facts point
toward a straightforward conclusion. Where funds were given to religious
entities in support of a good like education, the fact that the money was
acquired through coercion was not enough to make it a church tax.
But what about instances where resources actually were given for the
exclusive purpose of supporting religious worship, but the coercive element was
loosened or done away with entirely? Here, the evidence is clear on one point
and less clear on another.
The clearer point is that proponents of religious liberty maintained their
objections to tax schemes aimed exclusively at ﬁnancing religion even when
those schemes contained opt-outs or exemptions. General assessment
proposals like those in Virginia or Maryland attempted to lessen the coercive
element in church taxes by allowing citizens to support education or the poor
rather than churches if they opted to do so. As noted above, however, those
adjustments were inadequate to blunt the objection that these schemes

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90–100, 110–120 and accompanying text (Virginia); supra notes 226–241 and
accompanying text (Maryland).
376 See supra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (North Carolina); supra notes 269–275 and
accompanying text (New York); supra notes 293–298 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania).
377 See supra notes 300–312 and accompanying text (describing funding of religious education
in the District of Columbia using fees from licenses and later an education tax); supra notes 331–337,
347 and accompanying text (describing funding of religious schools in federal territories, presumably
using revenues from taxes on imports).
373
374
375
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mandate a coerced tithe.378 That conclusion may have rested in part on the
belief that the opt-outs were not always genuine alternatives.379 But the more
basic point seems to have been that—whether church taxes contained
exemptions or not—they still assumed that government had the power to
compel people to pay money solely to ﬁnance religious functions. And
because payments given exclusively to support religion had always been
viewed as an act of worship, government lacked the power to require them
just as it lacked the power to compel other religious observances.
The more complicated problem was schemes that provided state resources
solely to ﬁnance religion but did so without any coercion whatever. And by
far, the most signiﬁcant issue on that score was land grants to churches.
Land grants had long been a feature of traditional religious
establishments. Glebe lands were mandated by Anglican canon law and
similar lands had long been provided in New England townships.380 The
purpose of these grants was to provide not just space for a parsonage or
church, but also a perpetual source of revenue to fund the minister’s salary or
the maintenance of worship spaces.381 In at least some states, these land grants
continued after church taxes had been outlawed.382 But they were also a
matter of some debate. Understanding that debate provides a ﬁnal insight
into the nature of the argument that church taxes were a coerced observance.
One early skirmish took place in the Continental Congress. In 1785,
Congress considered a bill organizing lands in the Northwest Territory. The
bill, which eventually became known as the Land Ordinance of 1785, included
a provision requiring that one section of each township would be reserved for
a local school, and another “for the support of religion.”383 It further stated
that “[t]he proﬁts arising therefrom in both instances [were] to be applied for
ever according to the will of the majority of male residents of full age.”384 The
school provision passed without incident.385 But the religion provision was
more controversial.

378 See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text (describing objections to the general
assessment proposals in Virginia); supra notes 217-223 and accompanying text (describing
Maryland).
379 See, e.g., supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing this argument in relation to
Virginia’s proposed general assessment).
380 See McConnell, supra note 41, at 2148 (noting that Anglican canon law required providing
glebe lands for the minister of each parish and noting similar grants in New England).
381 Id. (observing that a glebe “was income-producing land, either farmed or rented by the
minister,” and that it “form[ed] a kind of permanent endowment”).
382 See, e.g., supra note 268 and accompanying text (noting land grants in New York).
383 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 293 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1933).
384 Id.
385 Id. at 375-81 (recording the ﬁnal version of the ordinance and the vote enacting it).
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Beginning the discussion, Charles Pinkney of South Carolina made a
motion to delete the phrase “for the support of religion,” and replace it with
“for religious and charitable uses.”386 William Ellery of Rhode Island followed
up by making a more notable motion. Ellery moved to delete the phrase
“religious and,” which would have left the land grant only for “charitable
uses.”387 The motion failed. But immediately after, Ellery made another
motion to delete entirely the paragraph providing land reserved for
religion.388 There was no reason to expect a diﬀerent result on the merits. But
through clever phrasing, the question calling Ellery’s second motion made
deletion the default option: “[S]hall the former part stand?”389 And because
the provision failed to receive the support of the seven states required for
passage, the language regarding religion was struck.390
The deletion of the religion provision from the Land Ordinance of 1785
was not the result of widespread disapproval. The actual vote count on
retaining the grant was seventeen representatives in favor, six against.391 But
the matter seems to have been far from resolved. In 1787, the ﬁnal version of
the Northwest Ordinance again consciously rejected the idea that townships
be required to reserve parcels exclusively for the support of religion.392 Yet
two individual contracts created roughly contemporaneously with the

Id. at 293.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 294.
Id.
Id. at 295. For an account of the vote and an explanation of the rules in the Continental
Congress regarding voting by state, see Michael S. Ariens, Church State in Ohio, 1785–1833, in
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS, supra note 126, at 249-51. A month after the vote, James Madison
wrote to James Monroe, one of Virginia’s representatives in Congress, stating his approval: “How a
regulation so unjust in itself, so foreign to the Authority of Cong, so hurtful to the sale of public
land, and smelling so strongly of an antiquated Bigotry, could have received the countenance of a
[Committee] is truly matter of astonishment.” Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May
29, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
391 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 383, at 295; see also Ronald
A. Smith, Freedom of Religion and the Land Ordinance of 1785, 24 J. CHURCH & STATE 589, 596-600
(1982) (discussing the votes of individual representatives and the role that religion played in their
respective states).
392 See Ariens, supra note 390, at 253-54 (observing that unlike earlier drafts which could have
been interpreted otherwise, the final version of the Northwest Ordinance “did not require the territorial
governments to reserve sections of land for the financial support of religion”); see also Northwest
Ordinance (July 13, 1787), 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 334, 340
(Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) (acknowledging the importance of “[r]eligion, [m]orality, and knowledge,”
and going on to declare that “[s]chools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged”).
386
387
388
389
390
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Ordinance required land be set aside for religion in townships covered by
those purchases.393 After 1794, however, no other federal contract did so.394
The fact that land grants for churches appear to have been a subject of
some confusion is not surprising. Perhaps the most important argument
against church taxes was that those taxes mandated a coerced religious
oﬀering—a sacriﬁce of one’s property solely to ﬁnance religious worship. But
land grants were not readily susceptible to that objection. Such grants did not
force any citizen to part with personal resources to support worship. Instead,
they simply provided a share of existing government resources for those
purposes. But proponents of religious liberty were hardly content to leave the
matter there. And again, probably the most important evidence of their views
comes from Connecticut.
In 1793, less than a decade after the debate over the land ordinances in
Congress, Connecticut enacted a law that raised similar issues. The law
declared that all funds collected from the sale of the state’s western lands be
appropriated to “the several Ecclesiastical Societies, Churches, or
Congregations of all denominations” to support “their respective Ministers
or Preachers of the Gospel, and Schools of Education.”395 Eventually, the law
was amended to allow local majorities within each township to determine
whether the money was to be “applied to the Support of the Worship and
Ministry,” or only for “the Support of Schools.”396
In arguing in favor of the western lands law, its supporters observed the
important diﬀerence between traditional church taxes and proceeds from land
sales. Unlike church taxes, money from land sales would be “a free donation
from the state,” and thus acceptable even to “those denominations of
[C]hristians whose principles forbid their having recourse to the civil arm to
compel individuals . . . to contribute to the support of religion.”397
Proponents of religious liberty—especially the state’s Baptists and
Methodists—rejected that argument. But they could not fully deny its force.
One author, writing under the pseudonym “Farmer,” exempliﬁed the
dissenters’ position.398 He began by noting that funding for schools was
393 See Ariens, supra note 390, at 254-55 (describing how these contracts required reserving
ministerial lands).
394 Smith, supra note 391, at 592 (“The provision for religion in the Symmes tract was the last
one to be included in a land grant from the federal government.”); see also Ariens, supra note 390, at
255 (noting that Washington signed the Symmes patent, the second of the two agreements, in 1794).
395 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 968 (providing the text of the law prior to amendment).
396 See CONN. COURANT, Nov. 3, 1794 (quoting an earlier version of 1795 Conn. Pub. Acts
487); see also 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 969 (describing the amendment and the public
debate surrounding it).
397 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 973 (quoting CONN. COURANT, Mar. 16, 1795).
398 Id. at 972 (identifying Farmer as exemplifying “[t]he stand of the Baptists and other
dissenters on the Western Lands Act”).
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indeed a “desirable object,” and one that he had no qualms about
supporting.399 The problem was “solely . . . [the law’s] making provisions for
the perpetual support of ministers and teachers of the gospel,” which was
objectionable because “[i]t is no part of the duty or business of civil rulers . . .
to make provision out of the property of the state” for such purposes.400 In so
arguing, however, Farmer did not explicitly claim that the Western Lands Act
required a coerced religious observance.401 Rather, he appealed to other
adjacent arguments. “[T]he Divine author . . . [never] left on record any
injunction . . . that the gospel or its ministers were committed to the trust or
recommended to the care of civil rulers.”402 The state was “neither qualiﬁed
nor authorized” to make judgments concerning religious truth or those
properly suited to preach it.403 Such support would corrupt “the purity of the
original institution as taught and exempliﬁed in the gospel” by making
support dependent on a magistrate’s approval.404 Noncoercive support
provided by land sales probably could not be said to require a religious
sacriﬁce on the part of individual citizens. But it was still objectionable
because it provided public property solely to support religious functions: “[I]t
is generally admitted that considered simply as being ministers of the gospel,
it is not the proper duty of civil rulers . . . to provide them support from the
property of the state.”405 And indeed, that same conviction seems to have been
at the heart of a ﬁnal important controversy over land grants a few years later,
this one again in Congress.
In 1809, Baptists in the Mississippi Territory wrote a letter to Congress
requesting that it secure for them a parcel of land.406 The letter explained that
they had built a church on land belonging to the United States, only to realize
that the only means to secure this land was through a “public sale.”407 The
church worried that being forced to purchase the land this way “might subject
us to pay, not only the value of the land, but a considerable part of the value
of the [church],” or at the very least force it to purchase a much bigger parcel
than it needed.408 Notably, the Baptists stopped short of asking for a
”Farmer,” Messi’rs Printers, CONN. COURANT, May 11, 1795.
Id.
However, he did note that in general “a christian . . . is obliged to contribute to the support
of that wherein he thinks christianity to consist,” and that “civil rulers [cannot] absolve him from
this duty by disposing of his property to support that which they judge orthodox.” Id.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 Application of a Committee of the Baptist Church at Salem, Mississippi, for the Land on
Which the Church Stands (Jan. 7, 1809), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MISCELLANEOUS 11, 11 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834).
407 Id.
408 Id.
399
400
401
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donation. Instead, the church asked Congress to pass a law “to secure us [the]
land, and on such terms as you in your wisdom may think proper.”409
Congress responded by including the church in a bill which reserved the
relevant ﬁve acres of land “for the use of the Baptist church.”410 James
Madison, now serving as President, vetoed the bill, declaring that it
“comprise[d] a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the
United States, for the use and support of religious societies, contrary to the
article of the constitution which declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting a religious establishment.”411
Madison did not explain the reasons underlying his conclusion. But it
seems likely that he viewed the matter just as Baptists and other religious
dissenters in Connecticut did. Providing land solely to support a church’s
worship did not involve individual coercion, and thus may not have been
comparable to a compulsory tithe. But it still risked setting a dangerous
precedent that the United States had power to appropriate property for the
exclusive purpose of ﬁnancing religion. That objection apparently did not
apply to religious schools, at least if Madison’s behavior is any indication.412
But it applied to land grants given exclusively to support a church as a church,
even if those grants did not involve coercing anyone.
Individual coercion was a hallmark of most church tax schemes. Yet as
with earmarks, the element of coercion appears to have been neither
necessary nor suﬃcient to trigger objections. Many states and the federal
government supported religious schools with various forms of coercive
taxation, but those programs seem to have been accepted without objection.
Likewise, although supporters of religious liberty conspicuously avoided
claiming that programs like land grants for churches could be compared to
coerced tithes, they nonetheless objected to these schemes where they aimed
solely to ﬁnance religious functions. At a more general level, however, the
fact that this issue was relatively unsettled provides further reason think that
the argument equating church taxes with coerced observance was central to
the debate.

Id.
Id. at 154.
President Madison’s Objections to the “Bill for the Relief of Richard Tervin, William
Coleman, Edwin Lewis, Samuel Mims, Joseph Wilson, and the Baptist Church at Salem MeetingHouse, in the Mississippi Territory” (Feb. 28, 1811), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 406, at 154, 154.
412 As Nathan Chapman has noted, during Madison’s administration the government’s
partnerships with missionary schools among the Native American tribes actually increased. See
Chapman, supra note 337, at 9.
409
410
411
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS
The history described above lacks clarity at certain points. In many states,
there is only limited evidence about how ordinary citizens thought about
church taxes or distinguished them from other kinds of funding schemes.
Moreover, although the views of Baptists and other proponents of religious
liberty can be known with more clarity, it is unclear how widely their more
radical objections—especially to things like chaplains or land grants—were
shared among their contemporaries. Yet even acknowledging these limits, the
evidence considered above suggests several conclusions that can be stated
with some conﬁdence. It is worth brieﬂy discussing what the history allows
us to say before discussing its implications.
The ﬁrst issue the history clariﬁes is the basic terms of the debate. As the
evidence from places like Virginia, Massachusetts, and Maryland suggests,
both opponents and supporters of church taxes generally agreed that
government could not require citizens to engage in particular forms of
religious worship. They did not agree, however, about whether that truism
also applied to church taxes.
Proponents of church taxes argued that so long as those schemes did not
explicitly favor one church or leave dissenters with no choice about where
their funds were directed, they were acceptable. Supporters of religious
freedom like James Madison, Isaac Backus, and others responded by asserting
that those defenses missed the point. By requiring payments from citizens
speciﬁcally designed to ﬁnance religious worship, church taxes required each
person to make a sacriﬁce to God. And as a result, they reasoned, those taxes
exceeded government’s rightful authority regardless of whether they
supported one church or many, and regardless of whether they built in
exemptions or other kinds of allowances for dissenters. In later years,
supporters of religious liberty extended their objection to schemes involving
general taxes and land grants for churches. But these were skirmishes that
arose out of the main issue. For the Founding generation, the key question
seems to have been whether church taxes were a coerced religious observance
and thus an improper form of religious establishment.
The second thing the history makes clear involves the scope of the
objection. In states that had never collected church taxes like Pennsylvania or
those that had ended the practice like Virginia, legislatures ceased providing
money solely to support religious functions. But the same was not true of
funding given to religious institutions for other reasons.
In every single state that rejected church taxes between 1776 and the
decade after the Establishment Clause was ratiﬁed, churches and other
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religious institutions eventually received public money for education.413 The
same was true of the federal government and actors under its control who
funded religious education in the District of Columbia and other missionary
schools for almost a century after the adoption of the Establishment Clause.
We cannot know for certain why supporters of religious liberty objected to
church taxes but did not object to that practice. But very likely, they believed
that providing taxpayer funds solely to ﬁnance worship was a coerced tithe,
but the same was not true of programs providing funding for other reasons.
That theory tracks the arguments made by supporters of religious freedom
like Madison and Backus, and it links those arguments to widespread practice
in this period. It also explains why even Baptists and Quakers actively sought
such funds for their own schools while simultaneously opposing church taxes.
Churches were not to receive public money solely to support their worship,
because such funding essentially required each citizen to make a religious
oﬀering. But the same was not true of funding for things like education, even
if beneﬁciaries used some of the funds for religion.
The third thing the history illuminates concerns the no-aid theory. As the
foregoing indicates, funding for religious schools during the Founding period
was virtually ubiquitous in states that ended church taxes, and the same was
true at the federal level for decades after the Establishment Clause was
ratiﬁed. And given those facts, one might wonder: if the no-aid theory is so
hard to reconcile with the evidence, why have so many people endorsed it as
a proper reading of history?
The answer has to do with a key ambiguity at the heart of the theory. In
Everson, Justice Black said that the historical evidence demonstrated that
because citizens cannot be forced to pay for religion they oppose, “[n]o tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions.”414 In one sense, that statement is absolutely accurate. In
rejecting church taxes, citizens at the Founding agreed that government had
no power to levy taxes “to support” religious activity, at least where “support”
is construed to mean “provide targeted funding for the religious function of
churches and ministers.” The error was in assuming that limitation also
applied to programs in which support for religion was incidental to some
other good. For the Founding generation, funding for religious schools did
not ‘support’ religion in a way that was prohibited, in all likelihood because
such programs bore no resemblance to coerced oﬀerings. The no-aid theory
was close enough to the truth to be plausible. But once the history is
413 Rhode Island banned church taxes in 1716, so is not technically included this group. But the
practice of Quakers there provides some reason to think a similar attitude may have been present in that
state too. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (noting Quaker efforts to obtain school funding).
414 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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understood, it becomes apparent that extending it beyond its original scope—
that is, beyond programs providing special funding for religious worship—
was a major mistake.
To be sure, one might contest that last point. Supporters of the no-aid
theory misunderstood the history by assuming that Founding-era sources
condemned support for religious schools. But it is true that, beginning in the
1850s and continuing into the early twentieth century, many states amended
their own constitutions to bar ﬁnancial support for “sectarian” schools.415 And
by 1875, people like James Blaine were advocating for a similar constitutional
amendment at the federal level.416 Thus, even if no one at the Founding
thought the Establishment Clause or any equivalent state provision forbade
government funding for religious schools, perhaps the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent practice made the broad no-aid rule
part of the Constitution.
This is not the place to engage in a full-scale discussion about the nature
of incorporation or the relationship between original meaning and
subsequent practice. However, two things are worth noting. First, assuming
one believes the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the
Constitution’s ban on religious establishment to the states,417 their practice
suggests that they did not view the Establishment Clause as banning aid to
religious schools either. During Reconstruction, the Freedmen’s Bureau
provided tens of thousands of dollars to religious schools, and that was in
addition to direct money grants provided by Congress itself.418 Moreover, the
push for a federal constitutional amendment by James Blaine and others
suggests that most citizens in this period probably did not understand the
Establishment Clause itself as forbidding funding for religious schools,
including denominational ones.
There is also a second point. Even acknowledging that many states
eventually ended funding for religious schools, there are major questions about
415 The literature describing this transformation is vast. See GLENN, supra note 335, at 154-73
(describing the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in the 1870s over public funding for
religious schools, and the eventual legislative push to end public funding for religious schools); LLOYD
P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825–1925, at 69-145 (1987)
(describing how conflict between Catholics and Protestants, in the absence of a federal ban on funding
sectarian schools, led to mobilization in the States to take funding away from denominational schools
in order to defund Catholic schools).
416 See GLENN, supra note 335, at 168-73 (discussing the anti-Catholic history of the “Blaine
Amendments” and explaining how action on the no-aid theory shifted from the federal to state level).
417 See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1085, 1150 (1995) (arguing that in the period
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment “the Establishment Clause was understood
as the substantive equal of the Free Exercise Clause, and . . . the principle of nonestablishment
applied at both the state and federal level”).
418 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 512-21 (describing these expenditures).

2020]

Church Taxes

185

how seriously that practice should be taken as informing the Constitution’s
meaning. As the Espinoza majority pointed out, the claim that government
funding for religious schools was unconstitutional arose out of intense
Protestant-Catholic conflict.419 More specifically, it arose out of a desire on the
part of Protestants to deny funding to Catholic schools while retaining state
support for common schools which were unabashedly and self-consciously
Protestant.420 One could argue this discriminatory context should not color
the history as a whole.421 But doing so requires explaining why a practice with
such a dubious pedigree ought to trump pervasive Founding-era evidence,
arguably rooted in clear principle, that funding for religious education is
permissible. And assuming that Founding-era history is controlling—as every
member of the Supreme Court has to at least some degree—that history
contains several important implications for modern doctrine.422
The most obvious implication relates to the basic orientation of the Court’s
jurisprudence. Recently, several Justices insisted that the Court’s modern
emphasis on neutrality in its funding jurisprudence has “no basis in the history
to which the Court has repeatedly turned to inform its understanding of the
Establishment Clause.”423 And numerous scholars have made similar
assertions.424 But the foregoing history suggests a different conclusion.
For proponents of religious liberty at the Founding, church taxes were
objectionable because their exclusive aim was ﬁnancing worship, which made
them indistinguishable from a coerced tithe. But the same objection did not
apply when funds were provided to religious entities for other reasons, most
notably for education. On the contrary, where the government’s interest in
providing funding rested on something other than ﬁnancing religion for its
140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258-59 (2020).
See Laycock, supra note 13, at 145-46 (describing this history); see also John C. Jeﬀries &
James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300-05 (2001)
(concluding that “religious rivalry and anti-Catholic prejudice” was a “prominent” factor in state
bans on aid to religious schools). For a more expansive account, see PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 193-335 (2002). The Court acknowledged this same fact in
Espinoza. See 140 S. Ct. at 2259 (noting the “checkered tradition” of denying funding to religious
schools, and that both the Blaine Amendment and “many of its state counterparts” arose out of
“pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
421 See Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295, 29599 (2008) (admitting that historians have characterized the Blaine Amendment as discriminatory but
arguing that there was an understood “prohibition on state funding of religious education” before the
Amendment); see also STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL AND THE CONSTITUTION
225-36 (2012) (advancing a similar argument).
422 See generally Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2258-59 (2020) (discussing Founding-era history); id. at
2285-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 2296-97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (same).
423 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2030-31 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
424 See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
419
420
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own sake, even the most extreme advocates of religious liberty viewed it as
wholly unobjectionable. And under modern conditions, that view leads to
“neutral” treatment between secular and religious recipients as a matter of
course. Where government provides funds to pay for public goods rather than
solely to ﬁnance religion, it will necessarily treat religious and secular entities
receiving those funds similarly as a matter of course. Contrary to at least some
modern rhetoric, Founding-era history does not contradict the Court’s
modern funding jurisprudence. On the contrary, it vindicates the doctrine in
its major respects, though it does so indirectly.
Yet if the history largely justiﬁes the general direction of the Court’s
jurisprudence, it does not always justify the speciﬁc choices the Court has
made. One example involves rules about direct funding given to religious
recipients. In Mitchell v. Helms, Justice O’Connor insisted that although
religious entities can receive direct aid to further secular goods, the
Establishment Clause demands those funds be strictly conﬁned so they are
not diverted to anything religious.425 The Court in Espinoza left that principle
undisturbed, at least for now.426 But if the foregoing history is accurate, that
limitation was erroneous. As the evidence suggests, for members of the
Founding generation who opposed church taxes, it was not the use of the
money in isolation that mattered. What mattered was whether money was
oﬀered to religious entities in support of some public aim rather than simply
to ﬁnance religion.427 Where such funding was given in support of a good like
education, speciﬁc decisions about the use of those funds by beneﬁciaries
appear to have been irrelevant. The focus on the use of government dollars
apart from a program’s larger purpose is a holdover from the no-aid theory,
not a reﬂection of Founding-era history.
A version of the same corrective could be oﬀered in other areas. School
vouchers are a good example. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court
concluded that a voucher program providing money for parents to send their
children to either religious or secular schools did not violate the

425 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838-44 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that “actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination” is forbidden
under the Establishment Clause, even where a program distributes funds to religious and secular
recipients on a neutral basis).
426 See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254 (noting that under the scholarship program at issue, money
“makes its way to religious schools only as a result of Montanans independently choosing to spend
their scholarships at such schools” by donating to private scholarships supporting those schools).
427 For a sampling of other historical sources making a similar point, see Stephanie H. Barclay,
Brady Earley, & Annika Boone, Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause: A Corpus Linguistics
Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 550-51 (2019). As the authors observe, the sources do not identify
“neutral forms of government ﬁnancial support for religious organizations . . . as a characteristic of
establishment.” Id. at 551.
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Establishment Clause.428 In so holding, the Court stressed—consistent with
the history above—that the program was constitutional in part because it was
demonstrably neutral as to religion: it oﬀered money without “deliberately
skew[ing] incentives toward religious schools.”429 Yet the Court also said that
because the program funded religious activity, it was important that the funds
be channeled through “individual recipients” like parents.430 That latter
ruling was an unconvincing formalism and has been rightly criticized as
constitutional money laundering.431 But in truth, the problem was not Zelman
itself, but rather the idea that government may never provide funds that
might also be used by a recipient for something religious.
As originally understood, the Establishment Clause almost surely did not
prohibit government from funding religious activity, at least where such
funding was incidental to furthering some other good. And that fact puts
Zelman’s talk about private choice in a new light. Creating a program in which
private individuals exercise ultimate choice about how funds are directed can
be a good way to display that the government is acting neutrally with respect
to religion. But the history indicates it is certainly not required. The question
is whether a funding program aims at something other than ﬁnancing religion
for its own sake, not whether government dollars might be used for something
religious along the way.
To be sure, there are complications lurking here. The most obvious one
involves programs that employ formally neutral criteria but use them as a
gerrymander to channel money to the government’s favored religious
recipients. That danger is especially acute where a program employs vague or
highly discretionary criteria, which might allow oﬃcials to favor or disfavor
speciﬁc religious activities or viewpoints.432 There were at least accusations
that George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative which provided funds for the
social service activities of religious groups had this problem,433 and one could
imagine other examples too.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 652.
See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuﬄer, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L. J. 167, 187-91 (2000) (insisting that the Court’s reasoning
in Zelman suggests that “money can simply be laundered through ‘private choice’ as a way to avoid
Establishment Clause guarantees”). For a nuanced examination of the money-laundering objection
in relation to Zelman speciﬁcally, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers,
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 93547 (2003), in which the authors explain that the Zelman majority very likely retained this
requirement to attract Justice O’Connor’s vote).
432 See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, Espinoza, Government Funding, and Religious Choice,
36 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680167 (“The
more discretionary the criteria, the greater the risk of discrimination in the award of funds . . . .”).
433 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 156-57, 157 n.176 (collecting and describing these complaints).
428
429
430
431
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The Founders did not deal with the problem of gerrymandered funding
schemes speciﬁcally, though they did sometimes contend that schemes like
general assessments were attempts to shore up one church’s dominance.434
Here again, however, a comparison to historic church tax regimes is a helpful
starting place. As we have already observed, church taxes schemes and their
analogues provided funds solely to ﬁnance a religious function. Even at the
Founding, however, those schemes were the exception. Funding for religious
schools existed in every state that had ended church taxes, and as far as I am
aware, none of those programs were accused of being a covert attempt to
ﬁnance worship. On the contrary, other than New York’s controversial moves
to end funding for denominational education, those programs did not
formally recognize the religious practice of recipients at all.
The same will likely be true of most programs today. When religious
entities are included in funding programs for homeless shelters, scholarship
programs, or historic preservation grants, the law does not take account of
their religious practice. It cares about the services they provide, and the
programs are structured to get the government its money’s worth. And where
those programs rely on relatively objective criteria, any diﬀerences in funding
will usually be traceable to factors like the availability of providers in a
particular area or the quality of the services rendered. To be sure, there may
be outliers, and courts should be on the lookout for them. But unless the
decision to fund is explainable only in terms of religion—that is, unless the
evidence of religious bias demonstrates that the program is eﬀectively a
church tax in disguise—comparing a funding scheme to a compulsory tithe
or anything like it is not very credible.
The history also has also another implication, this one concerning the
mechanics of litigation. For purposes of Article III standing, the Court has
treated Establishment Clause claims as an exception to the rule against
“taxpayer standing,” based on the erroneous conclusion that Madison thought
the Clause would be violated anytime beneﬁciaries used taxpayer funds “to
aid religion.”435 But again, the history above oﬀers some help.
If the proper rule is that government may not provide funds solely to
ﬁnance religious functions, the Court would have two options. On the one
hand, it could retain broad taxpayer standing and instruct lower courts to
dispose of cases at the motion to dismiss stage in light of the correct
substantive rule. That strategy would reﬂect the belief—arguably held by at
434 See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 53, at 147 (observing that opponents of the general assessment
in Virginia saw the scheme as “merely a covert way of aiding the Anglican Church”); see also “A
Christian,” Messrs. Goddard and Langworthy, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, May 17, 1785 (speculating
that Maryland’s general assessment was a plot to prop up the Anglican Church).
435 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (describing Madison’s concerns and the
current test for taxpayer standing).
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least some at the Founding—that money given exclusively to support a
religious function is comparable to a coerced tithe even when it originates
from a general tax.436 But just as sensibly, the Court could also limit standing
solely to entities that have actually been denied funds under a program (rather
than extending it to any aggrieved taxpayer). That approach would probably
enforce the rule just as well, since it seems unlikely a program designed
exclusively to ﬁnance religion could do so without excluding beneﬁciaries
who would otherwise be entitled to support.437 Either strategy would capture
the spirit of Founding-era views about funding for religion, and either would
help bring an end to the mischief of the Court’s earlier jurisprudence.
There is one ﬁnal point worth discussing. If the Constitution does not
aﬃrmatively forbid allowing beneﬁciaries to use money for religious activity,
does it have anything to say about a government’s choice to embrace that
restriction of its own accord? Even if the government may enact neutral
programs that convey funds to religious recipients without restricting their
use, could a state choose to exclude beneﬁciaries engaged in religious activity
as a policy choice?
Answering that question involves two diﬀerent considerations. The ﬁrst
has to do with justiﬁcations for a refusal to fund. In Locke v. Davey, the
Supreme Court held that a state could exclude a student from a scholarship
program because he chose to major in devotional theology.438 According to
the Court, that exclusion was permissible in part because a theology degree
is about training to be a minister, and the Founding generation “prohibited
any tax dollars from supporting the clergy.”439 Yet as the foregoing suggests,
that reading of the history was very likely incorrect.
Proponents of religious freedom at the founding objected to support for
ministers “under that name”440 or “in the Pursuit of religious Duties.”441 But
they did not object to funding ministers or churches in pursuit of public
goods. On the contrary, New York provided tax money directly to churches
of all kinds to fund their free schools, and the same was true in Maryland,
436 See supra notes 345–368 and accompanying text (describing these objections). At a
minimum, however, the historical evidence suggests that where a funding scheme lacks any kind of
individual coercion it probably cannot be compared to a coerced tithe provided by taxpayers. The
modern Supreme Court has reasoned similarly. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563
U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (holding taxpayers have standing when a funding program involves the
expenditure of taxes taken by coercion, but not when it involves tax credits).
437 For one thoughtful argument that the Court’s approach to Article III standing under the
Establishment Clause has been misguided, see Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and
Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV.
655 (2009).
438 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
439 Id. at 723.
440 Backus, supra note 73, at 216-17.
441 PHIPPS, supra note 190, at 6.
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New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.442 Moreover, the Court’s insistence
that the problem in Locke involved funding for an “essentially religious
endeavor” is true only if one focuses on the use of money by a single
beneﬁciary while ignoring the scholarship program itself.443 Were a state to
enact a program whose sole ambition was to fund ministerial training or
religious worship, there is no doubt it would be unconstitutional. But that
limitation does not apply to programs that fund schools, soup kitchens, or
university scholarships and are available to religious and nonreligious
recipients like the program in Locke. A state may have many legitimate
reasons for limiting funding. But history provides little support for the idea
that restrictions on religious use can be justiﬁed as ﬂowing from
“antiestablishment interests” with a Founding-era pedigree.444
The second point concerns the obligation to fund itself. The history above
contains limited evidence about whether the founding generation thought
government has a responsibility to fund religious entities when it chooses to
fund secular ones. But that should not be surprising. Apart from modest
funding for schools, the government funded almost nothing in the private
sector in this period, making selective funding claims rare by default.445
Moreover, although Founding-era views are broadly consistent with the
Court’s modern framework, the Founding generation itself did not actually
employ a conceptual framework calling for “neutrality” between religious and
secular recipients. Nonetheless, the historical record oﬀers at least some
reason to think that cases like Espinoza are broadly consistent with the
Founding-era understanding.
Most notably, where religious entities at the Founding were excluded
from otherwise available funding solely because of their religious activity,
they protested vigorously. In the debate over school funds in Georgetown,
the city oﬃcial speaking in favor of the city’s Catholics expressed concern
over “any portion of our citizens [being] excluded from a just participation of
any investment of the public funds in consequence of a peculiarity of religious

442 See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text (New York); supra notes 234-241 and
accompanying text (Maryland); supra notes 285-290 and accompanying text (New Jersey and
Delaware); supra notes 291-298 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania).
443 Locke, 540 U.S. at 721. The focus on a single beneﬁciary’s use was also in signiﬁcant tension
with a prior case in which the Court evaluated the scholarship program “as a whole.” See Witters v.
Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986) (holding that the Establishment Clause
did not bar a blind student from using state-scholarship funds to attend a bible college and train to
be a minister).
444 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722 (justifying a theology student’s exclusion from an otherwise
available scholarship program on the basis of “antiestablishment interests” grounded in history).
445 Laycock, supra note 13, at 142 (noting the paucity of government funding programs in the
Founding era).
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faith.”446 Likewise, in New York, the Congregation of Shearith Israel went so
far as to say that such discrimination violated “the liberal spirit of our
constitution, which recognizes no distinction in religious worship.”447 In both
instances, religious minorities confronted with selective funding argued that
such exclusions were unjust or even unconstitutional. And in both instances,
their views prevailed.
To be sure, these historical examples might be distinguishable from the
modern cases. After all, they involve selective funding for other religious schools,
not the decision to fund only secular ones. But the logic of the Founding-era
arguments seems to apply with equal force to the latter context too.
Funding for religious schools did not fall within the Founding-era
objection to church taxes, likely because such funding was not provided for
the exclusive purpose of ﬁnancing religion. Instead, many Founding-era
citizens thought it was denying funding for schools solely because of their
religion activity that was prohibited. Part of the rationale for that conclusion
was the belief that such denials functioned as a penalty on religious practice—
they deprived citizens of “a just participation of . . . investment of the public
funds in consequence of . . . religious faith” as the oﬃcial in Georgetown put
it.448 But even more, the idea that government could not exclude citizens from
beneﬁts solely on the basis of religious activity was just the ﬂip side of the
objection to church taxes. Just as government could not extract funds
exclusively for a religious function, neither could it withhold funds provided
for other purposes solely because of religion. And that principle seems to
apply just as readily to programs that categorically exclude all religious
recipients rather than just recipients of a particular faith.
What is more, Jeﬀerson’s correspondence with the Catholic nuns in New
Orleans provides reason to think the federal Constitution contained the same
principle.449 Recall that, following the Louisiana Purchase, the nuns wrote to
Jeﬀerson to inquire whether their school—which now arguably rested on
property belonging to the United States—would be allowed to continue.
Jeﬀerson responded by assuring them that the “principles of the constitution”
conﬁrmed that their school was “ensure[ed] . . . the patronage of the
government” for its public service, “whatever diversity of shade may appear
in the religious opinions of our fellow citizens.”450 If the property of the New
Orleans school had actually passed to the United States, allowing the nuns to
use it was a form of government subsidy. Yet here too, Jeﬀerson suggested
See WARNER, supra note 314, at 77.
See The Memorial of the Trustees of the Congregation of Sheerith Israel Convened, supra
note 281, at 95.
448 See WARNER, supra note 314, at 77.
449 For a full recounting of the incident, see supra notes 324–330 and accompanying text.
450 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Ursuline Nuns of New Orleans, supra note 326, at 78-79.
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that federal assistance for the Catholic school’s “charitable objects” was
perfectly permissible.451 But even more than that, he also strongly implied
that the “principles of the constitution” indicated that the federal government
could not discontinue that subsidy solely because of a disagreement with the
nuns’ “religious opinions.”452 Again, the point seems the same as that oﬀered
by Shearith Israel in New York and Catholics in Georgetown, now applied to
the federal constitution. According to Jeﬀerson, at least, the First
Amendment prohibited denying otherwise available beneﬁts where the sole
reason was religion, just as it prohibited extracting funds where the sole
reason was religion.
CONCLUSION
No one likes paying for causes they ﬁnd objectionable. But for the
Founders, that was not the starting place for managing our diﬀerences, even
our diﬀerences around religion. In 1790, George Washington wrote a letter to
Shearith Israel and America’s other Jewish congregations in which he
observed: “The liberality of sentiment toward each other which marks every
political and religious denomination of men in this Country, stands
unparalleled in the history of Nations.”453 And indeed, it was liberality that
deﬁned the attitude of the Founding generation toward funding for things
like schools. For them as for us today, religious disagreement was a source of
division. But without more, disagreement itself was not a limitation on the
government’s ability to support the public good.
On the best reading of the evidence, the Founders forbade government
from deploying tax money or other public resources where the sole ambition
was to ﬁnance religious worship. That conviction ﬂowed from the idea that
government could not coerce anyone to tithe, even to support one’s own faith.
But where no such ambition was present, it was Washington’s sentiment that
prevailed. To be sure, these Americans were not perfect in carrying out their
commitment to religious freedom. To their credit, however, they largely
agreed that when it came to goods like education or provision for the poor, it
was cooperation—not ‘no aid’—that deﬁned the country they founded. And
if historical practices and understandings are to guide our interpretation of
the Religion Clauses, that liberal sentiment is still the rule today.

451 Id. at 79 (“The charitable objects of your institution . . . cannot fail to ensure it the
patronage of the government it is under.”).
452 Id. at 78-79.
453 See Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregations in the Cities of Philadelphia,
New York, Charleston and Richmond (Dec. 13, 1790), reprinted in 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 61, 61 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1998).

